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INTRODUCTION
There always have been within the United States insular
communities with norms radically different from those of general
society. To preserve their way of life, many of these communities
have sought literally to govern themselves as independent entities
so as to be as free as possible from the influences of larger American
society. Examples include the Oneidas, the Hopedales, the
Mormons, Native Americans, the Rajneeesh,1 and, perhaps, today’s
militia movement.2 Scholars from across the political spectrum have
argued that, as a normative matter, foundational commitments
require that American society grant extensive powers of selfgovernance to at least some of these insular communities.3 This
Article asks the following question: As a doctrinal matter, what is
the maximum room American constitutional law leaves for such
communities to run their lives?
This Article identifies heretofore unnoticed flexibility in our
country’s federal system by showing that the scope of permissible
political autonomy at one subfederal level of government is larger
than is commonly thought. This finding is germane even to those
who do not believe that the normative questions concerning
whether and to what extent insular communities should be
permitted to run their own lives have been fully answered, for the
1. Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA . L. REV . 1053,
1071-86 (1998).
2. Susan P. Koniak, The Chosen People In Our Wilderness, 95 MICH. L. REV . 1761, 1783
(1997) (book review). It is unclear whether the militia movement would be willing to live
peaceably within the United States if they were permitted to largely govern themselves—in
which case they would qualify as an insular community—or if their true goal is to establish
their legal universe across the entire country.
3. Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM . L. REV .
1, 4 (1996) (arguing on the basis of liberal premises); Rosen, supra note 1, at 1089-1125
(arguing on the basis of Rawlsian liberal theory); Mark D. Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal
Cultures, Liberalism, and American Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP . LEGAL ISSUES
(forthcoming 2002) (arguing on basis of synthetic reading of Rawls and Kymlicka); see also
WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM , COMMUNITY , AND CULTURE 5 (1989) (discussing minority group
rights); ROBERT NOZIC K , ANARCHY, STATE , AND UTOPIA 297-331 (1974) (discussing the
extensive powers of self-governance that groups should be allowed); Robert M. Cover,
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV . L. REV . 4 (1983) (discussing society and
communities and their interaction with the law).
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conviction that the Constitution bars the exercise of extensive
governmental powers by insular communities may account for the
limited scholarly attention that has been paid to these underlying
normative questions. With the understanding that accommodating
these communities’ needs is constitutionally possible, other scholars
may revisit these issues.
Understanding how much room for self-governance is available
under contemporary law requires careful analysis of two possible
routes to self-governance: private ordering (through involuntary
associations or contract) and public ordering (by creating a new
local government). There are several fundamental differences
between these two options.4 On the one hand, privately ordered
groups might be said to have more freedom insofar as they are not
ordinarily subject to constitutional limitations.5 On the other hand,
private ordering has two important drawbacks vis-à-vis public
ordering. First, groups that opt for private ordering do not enjoy the
power to norm-shape and coerce via law—a profound handicap for
those communities that believe law has unique socializing powers.6
Second, whereas private ordering typically only adds obligations
onto society’s laws,7 public ordering may grant the political
4. This is true despite the fact that it sometimes can be difficult to distinguish, in both
law and fact, between public and private ordering. E.g., JOEL GARREAU , EDGE CITY 184-85
(1991) (describing how the privately owned Sun City, Arizona closely resembles a public
municipality).
5. With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Constitution limits
governmental actors, not private parties. E.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 619 (1991). Private groups would be subject to other constitutional limitations only if
they were deemed to be state actors under the state action doctrine, e.g., Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982), or if they were deemed to be federal agents.
See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 399 (1995) (holding that a
corporation can be an “agency” of the federal government).
6. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1064-71. Professor Koniak has noted that
[i]t is the commitment to act in accordance with the stories and norms that
makes . . . material law. Law, as opposed to other forms of normative discourse,
seeks to “impose meaning on [a resistant reality] . . . and then to restructure it
in the light of that meaning.” That is what separates law from literature; the
judge’s words from the philosopher’s; and [the militia movement’s] narratives
from those of others.
Koniak, supra note 2, at 1783 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RONALD DWORK IN , LAW ’S EMPIRE
47 (1986)); see also Koniak, supra note 2, at 1765-80 (discussing the Common Law World).
7. For an example of a rare statute that provides exceptions for private groups, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994). Title VII protections against gender discrimination are
inapplicable against an employer that is a “religious corporation, association, educational
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community immunity from some of general society’s regulations,8
increasing the extent to which the community can run its own life.
Whether private or public ordering ultimately holds out greater
promise vis-à-vis self-governance thus turns on two considerations.
First, what are the range of powers a group can exercise under
each? Second, what are the group’s particular needs?9 This Article
helps to answer the first question by clarifying the scope of public
power. It is part of a larger project that considers the maximal
powers of self-governance that can be exercised by communities in
the United States.10
Although the primary limits on the exercise of public power
are constitutional, this Article is not a restatement of ordinary
constitutional doctrines. Instead, it asks whether there are special
constitutional limitations that may be operative when insular
groups seek to exercise public power to govern themselves. In an
earlier article, I suggested an affirmative answer to this question:
ordinary federal and state courts may vary the application of
institution, or society.” Id.
8. For example, a group that constitutes itself as a municipality typically is not subject
to the ordinances of other municipalities. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712
(1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that an initial precipitator of the Satmar Chasidim’s
formation of the village of Kiryas Joel was a desire to free themselves from the town of
Monroe’s zoning requirements, which, among other things, disallowed the subdivision of
apartments, which was important to the community due to their large extended families).
Furthermore, the State is disabled from regulating in relation to matters that fall within a
municipality’s home rule immunity. E.g., City of LaGrande v. Public Employees Ret. Bd., 576
P.2d 1204, 1210-15 & n.30 (Or. 1978); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial
Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN . L. REV . 1173, 1175 & n.5 (1996) (noting that “[h]ome
rule provides localities some autonomy from the states of which they are a part, either by
allowing them to take certain actions without express grants of power from the state (‘home
rule initiative’) or by insulating them from state interference within a certain circumscribed
realm (‘home rule immunity’),” but also observing that “[b]oth of these attempts are plagued
with conceptual and practical difficulties”).
9. In a previous article I showed that some communities believe they require the powers
that attend public ordering to survive. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1064-89. For a similar account
of the militia movement, see Koniak, supra note 2, at 1764-85.
10. Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal
Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV . 479 (2000)
[hereinafter Rosen, Of Tribal Courts]; Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution:
Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX .
L. REV . 1129 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution]. For a preliminary
consideration of the prospects of private ordering, see Rosen, supra note 1, at 1086-87, 112930, 1143. In the future, I hope to more fully consider the scope of freedom afforded by private
ordering.
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constitutional standards as they are applied to insular groups,
allowing such communities more options in the exercise of public
power than ordinary state and local governments enjoy.11 This
Article examines an even more radical approach to the modulation
of constitutional limitations with respect to insular communities.
Rather than relying on federal and state courts to modify the
application of constitutional principles to insular groups, Congress
may empower the communities themselves to authoritatively
construe designated provisions of the Constitution insofar as the
provisions apply to them, subject to only modest limitations. This
would reduce (although certainly not eliminate) the most important
competitive advantage of private ordering over public ordering;
insular communities that opt for public ordering may be made
immune from constitutional limitations as construed by ordinary
federal and state courts, and may be subject instead to the good
faith determinations of their own community’s courts of what
limitations such constitutional provisions impose on them.
I recognize that at first glance (and perhaps even second or third)
this might appear to be a doubly problematic solution. Many people
would say, I imagine, that it would be best not to give insular
groups extensive powers of self-governance, and that if we do, we
should be sure to keep tight control over them. But sometimes our
larger commitments as a society lead us to tolerate activities we do
not like; flag burning and permitting the Nazis to march in Skokie
are prime examples.12 There is a similar normative claim here:
foundational commitments may demand that our society give
significant powers of self-governance to insular communities that

11. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1138-66.
12. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down law making flag burning a
crime); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding right of Nazis to march in
Skokie, a largely Jewish suburb then populated by large numbers of Holocaust survivors);
see also ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS , THE SKOKIE CASE , AND THE
RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979) (defending right of the Nazis to march). To be sure, many have
been critical of these applications of the First Amendment. E.g., Steven J. Heyman, Righting
the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U.
L. REV . 1275, 1389 (1998) (“From a rights-based perspective, one may well conclude that
there is no substantive right to engage in public hate speech, such as the Nazi march in
Skokie.”). In any event, the veracity of the point made above in text does not turn on
whether the courts were correct in permitting flag burning and Nazi marches.
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are willing to live in accordance with certain limitations.13 As
stipulated above, I will assume for present purposes that the
reader either agrees with this, or that she has suspended judgment
about the normative question so as to explore the scope of selfgovernance that our constitutional order potentially can accord such
communities.
The mechanism for self-governance proposed and explored
here—the delegation of circumscribed interpretive authority of
select provisions of the Constitution to a limited number of
“community-based courts”—is not as unique as it might at first
sound. In fact, it is very similar to the powers exercised by Native
Americans in Indian country.14 As explained in this Article, each
tribe’s courts are authorized to provide their own interpretations of
“due process,” “equal protection,” “search and seizure,” and the like,
with no review from federal courts in virtually all cases. As a result,
due process means one thing in Chicago, another in the 25,000
square miles of Navajo land, and yet something else on the
Nisqually reservation.
Elsewhere I have analyzed the many benefits of the regime of
community-based courts in Indian country.15 To quickly summarize,
the regime permits the creation of unique doctrines and governmental institutions that support Indian culture, and the avoidance
of doctrines and institutions that actively undermine it.16 Yet as
the regime sustains cultural heterogeneity, it simultaneously helps
to create a common nationwide culture insofar as all tribes are
interpreting the shared text of American constitutional principles.
Indeed, the tribes have deeply assimilated Anglo-constitutional
principles even as they have given them unique constructions that
reflect and support Indian culture.17
More generally, allowing diverse communities the opportunity to
authoritatively construe a shared text holds out the possibility of
creating commonality without commanding homogeneity. It is a
13. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14. “Indian country” is a statutory term denoting places of tribal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (2000).
15. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10.
16. Id. at 500, 511-22.
17. Id. at 525-78, 584.
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method for simultaneously coordinating a diverse citizenry and
championing heterogeneity.18 It is an approach that is consonant
with one of the federal system’s chief objectives of uniting without
snuffing out difference.
The mechanism for self-government developed in this Article
shows that these benefits could be achieved on behalf of non-Indian
communities as well. There would be important differences,
however, between community-based courts and the tribal courts.
Most importantly, the law the tribes interpret is statutory rather
than constitutional; the Constitution does not apply to Indian
tribes, and the “due process” and other limitations on tribal
governments that are construed by tribal courts derive from a
statute—the so-called Indian Civil Rights Act.19 Yet the tribal
experience is still highly instructive. This is because, as this Article
shows, the Constitution permits Congress to create communitybased courts for non-Indian communities that would be empowered
to provide their own interpretations of select federal constitutional
provisions, subject to only limited constraints, without review from
federal or state courts. Tribal courts accordingly provide a
suggestive glimpse of how a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters of constitutional language functions. The encouraging
results in Indian country suggest that similar benefits might be
obtained for other insular communities.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the law that
has created a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters in
Indian country. It then identifies the potential benefits and costs
of the tribal regime of multiple authoritative interpreters, and
summarizes the findings of an extensive empirical study of tribal
case law interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act. The study shows
that the tribal court regime has brought about significant benefits
at reasonable costs.
Part II explains how a similar regime of community-based courts
could be created on behalf of non-Indian communities. Creating
18. For the suggestion that the Bankruptcy Code analogously is drafted in a manner that
establishes national general policies but permits variations across localities so as to preserve
different local cultures, see Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV . 622, 630-33 (1999).
19. See infra notes 24-60 and accompanying text.
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community-based courts for non-Indian communities implicates
a variety of constitutional considerations that are not applicable
to tribal courts. The Article accordingly examines Congress’s powers
to strip jurisdiction from state and federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, which requires careful analysis of due process,
Article III jurisprudence, habeas corpus doctrine, and the
Exceptions Clause. Also necessary is an evaluation of congressional
powers in relation to federal lands, which calls into question the
Property Clause, because it is on such lands that the communities
would be situated.
A crucial distinction between tribal courts and the newly created
community-based courts would be the source of law each interprets:
whereas tribal courts construe statutory law, the community-based
courts would be interpreting constitutional provisions. Part III
considers to what extent this difference would limit communitybased courts’ interpretive freedom. It concludes that communitybased courts would enjoy most, but not all, of the interpretive
authority that tribal courts have. Part III explains why communitybased court deviations from ordinary constitutional doctrines would
not violate the foundational rules of interpretive hierarchy
established in cases such as Marbury v. Madison,20 Cooper v.
Aaron,21 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,22 and City of Boerne v. Flores.23
Part III also explains why the mere existence of multiple
authoritative interpreters of select constitutional provisions would
not run afoul of structural constitutional limitations.
Part IV examines other considerations that bear on the
pertinence of the tribal experience in respect of community-based
courts for non-Indian communities. Part IV explains why many of
the findings concerning tribal courts likely would transfer
seamlessly to community-based courts. It also, however, identifies
two unique risks that would be posed by community-based courts.

20. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”).
21. 358 U.S. 1, 1 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution.”); see infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
22. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
23. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
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Part IV then considers the factors that bear on predicting the
likelihood of their realization and their probable costs.
I. THE TRIBAL REGIME OF COMM UNITY -BASED COURTS
A. The Regime’s Doctrinal Construction.
The Constitution does not apply to tribal governments.24
Concerned with potential abuses of power by the tribes, Congress
imposed statutory obligations on tribal governments in the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) that, with only a few exceptions, track
verbatim the language of the Bill of Rights.25 For example, the
ICRA provides that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall . . . make or enforce any law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for a redress of grievances.”26 Similarly a tribe may not
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without
due process of law”27 or undertake “unreasonable search[es] and
seizures.”28
Although the ICRA is federal law, federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over only a small set of ICRA claims;29 according
to the Supreme Court, imposing limitations on tribes without
granting significant federal court jurisdiction was Congress’s way
24. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35
(10th Cir. 1959).
25. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 &
n.14 (1978). Some of the Bill of Rights provisions not statutorily applied against tribes are
the prohibition concerning the establishment of religion and the requirements of jury trials
in civil cases and appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases. Id. at 63.
26. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1).
27. Id. § 1302(8).
28. Id. § 1302(2).
29. Federal courts can hear claims only where a party is in “detention.” Id. § 1303;
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 70. In all other cases, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Furthermore, virtually all ICRA claims concerning detention are litigated in tribal rather
than federal courts. As a result, nearly all ICRA jurisprudence has been created by tribal
courts. For a more complete discussion of the extent of tribal courts’ independent jurisdiction,
see Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 485-88.
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of balancing the protection of individual rights against respect for
tribal autonomy.30 Of key significance, tribal courts are not
required to interpret the ICRA’s provisions as federal courts have
interpreted the ICRA’s sister terms in the Bill of Rights. Instead,
tribal courts may interpret due process, equal protection, and the
like, in light of tribal needs, values, customs, and traditions.31
Indeed, each tribe is allowed to develop its own interpretation of the
ICRA’s terms in light of its own tribe’s unique needs, values,
customs, and traditions.32
These doctrines collectively explain why tribal courts function
as a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters of quasiconstitutional federal law. Thus, although the Supreme Court has
articulated a specific interpretation of, for example, due process,
there is nonuniformity of interpretation of due process as between
general society and the enclaves of Indian country. Furthermore,
there is nonuniformity of interpretations as among Native
American communities. And with respect to due process, as is the
case with virtually all ICRA provisions, there is virtually no federal
court review over the tribal court interpretations.
B. The Regime’s Performance.
In an earlier article, I reported the results of a comprehensive
analysis of thirteen years of reported tribal court decisions
construing and applying the ICRA.33 The article considered the
potential benefits and costs of ICRA’s regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters of federal law, and concluded that
significant benefits had been achieved at only minimal costs.
More generally, the ICRA case law showcases the effects of
allowing diverse communities the power to independently and
30. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62.
31. Id. at 55 (noting that “standards of analysis developed under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause [are] not necessarily controlling in the interpretation
of” the ICRA); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976). Tribal courts have
authority to offer independent constructions even of those few ICRA provisions over which
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 487.
32. E.g., Rave v. Reynolds, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6137, 6139 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1995)
(noting that other tribes’ holdings are “not binding on this court”).
33. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 489-578.
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authoritatively construe identical legal texts. Shared
interpretations of legal texts, such as due process and equal
protection, help to create a common, nationwide culture. Yet the
power to offer independent interpretations simultaneously allows
diverse communities the opportunity to maintain, and even
advance, their distinctive cultures.
The potential benefits of ICRA’s regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters are institutional diversity and self-governance, both of
which support the well-being of tribal communities and tribal
culture.34 These potential benefits have been realized. The ICRA
regime has allowed for the creation of doctrines and novel
governmental institutions that reflect the distinctive needs and
values of Native Americans.35 For example, due process and free
speech have been construed so as to secure these Anglo-values
while still bolstering the traditional respect that is to be accorded
to tribal leaders;36 search and seizure has been interpreted so as to
protect individuals without disabling tribal police from undertaking
“welfare checks” that reflect the tribal value of proactively looking
after other members’ well-being;37 and the right to a jury has been
interpreted as an aspect of “participatory democracy” that requires
that jurors be allowed to direct questions to witnesses.38 Further
supporting tribal culture, the ICRA regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters has allowed the tribes to transform their community
narratives and self-understandings (of “welfare checks” and
“participatory democracy,” for example) from mere literature to law,
lending them the eminence, socializing power, and coercive
potential that characterize law. The opportunity to construe the
ICRA in accordance with tribal needs and values, in conjunction
with the novel doctrines and institutions that such interpretive

34. Id. at 500-01.
35. Id. at 512-78.
36. Id. at 516 (discussing tribal due process case of Colville Confederated Tribes v. Bray,
26 Indian L. Rptr. 6061 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1999)); id. at 553-54 (discussing free speech case
of Brandon v. Tribal Council for the Confederated Tribes, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6139 (Grand
Ronde Tribal Ct. 1991)).
37. Id. at 517 (discussing Hopi Tribe v. Kahe, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6079 (Hopi Tribal Ct.
1994)).
38. Id. at 519-20 (discussing Downey v. Bigman, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6145 (Navajo 1995)).
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freedom has afforded, collectively amount to a grant of extensive
opportunities for self-governance.
The principle potential costs of the ICRA’s regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters are the inefficiencies entailed by multiple
court systems, the imposition of externalities upon those outside
Indian country, and the risk of undermining the protection of
individual rights that the ICRA was intended to afford.39 The first
two costs are not significant.40 The third is of real concern, but a
careful analysis of the tribal case law suggests that such
“Protection” costs have been negligible. To begin with, it is
important to understand that as both a normative and doctrinal
matter, the mere fact that ICRA doctrines vary from Bill of Rights
doctrines does not indicate that Protection has been undermined.41
A careful look at the case law can yield some preliminary inductive
conclusions as to whether or not the ICRA regime has resulted in
unacceptable costs to Protection, though full analysis requires a
thick political theory that answers which communities ought to be
given extensive powers of self-governance and to what extent.42
Analyzed inductively, the legal doctrines tribal courts have created,
as well as their methods of interpretation, strongly suggest that
tribal courts have interpreted the ICRA in good faith, a necessary
though not sufficient condition for the containment of Protection
costs.43 The ICRA has been deployed to require significant changes
in tribal governmental practices and to create extensive rights for
individuals.44 Tribal courts take federal case law seriously and tend
to deviate from it only for good reasons.45 The tribal case law also
39. Id. at 501, 505-06.
40. With regard to the second potential cost, there are virtually no externalities because
the ICRA provisions govern activities that occur, and have consequences that remain, within
Indian country. Id. at 579. The first potential cost is real, but it is merely financial, and
tribes appear to be willing to absorb such monetary costs to gain for themselves the selfgovernance and other benefits that the regime affords. Furthermore, tribes have the option
of saving costs by forming regional courts that cater to multiple tribes, as some have done.
E.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts, 22 AM . INDIAN L. REV . 285, 291 n.27 (1998).
41. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 501-02.
42. Id. at 502-03.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 523-24, 529-78.
45. Id. at 513, 524-25.
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has fared well when analyzed under the lens of a thick normative
political theory that seeks to identify the appropriate outer limits
of community self-governance;46 there are no outcomes that flatly
violate the protections that tribal members ought to have, and the
reasoning of only one of the reported cases is clearly problematic.47
A particularly important finding of the study was that even
though tribal courts provide independent interpretations of the
ICRA, they appear to have deeply assimilated many Angloconstitutional values.48 There is evidence of tribal courts’ progressive fluency with the ICRA provisions:
[A] large number of tribal cases employ terms such as “due
pro cess,” “fund am enta l rights,” “equal protection,” “w arrant,”
“pro bab le cause,” and so forth, without citing to any statutory or
tribal con stitutional sou rces. Similarly, many recent tribal court
decisions that cite to an ICRA prov ision . . . articulate the
[applicable] Leg al Test w ithou t citing to case law even when
other parts o f the d ecision cite to legal autho rity to establish
legal propositions. Ready invocation of th e IC RA ’s terminology
and doctrine without statutory and case citation suggests that
the An glo-con cep ts ha ve wo rke d th eir w ays into tribal judg es’
basic professional vocabularies and ways of thinking. More
evidence of assimilation is that tribal courts sometimes attribute
the legislative purposes of advancing due process and other
Anglo-values to tribal ordinances and accordingly construe the
ordinances in ways that reflect those doctrines. Another sign of
deep assimilation is that tribal courts sometimes adopt federal
doctrines without apparently recognizing that there are
plausible alterna tives. 49

The result of tribal assimilation of Anglo-values is not the
displacement of Indian values, but a rich cultural syncretism
46. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1089-1106.
47. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 542-44 (discussing Winnebago Tribe v.
Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998)).
48. Id. at 525-29. In the words of one tribal court, “[a]lthough tribal due process may
differ when it comes to its application to customary and traditional laws, many of the
principles embodied in the Bill of Rights have become key ingredients in the Indian legal
processes . . . .” Teeman v. Burns Paiute Indian Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6197, 6199 (Burns
Paiute Tribal Ct. App. 1997).
49. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 527-28.
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between Anglo- and tribal values. Tribes frequently interpret the
ICRA’s terms by referring to tribal customs, and there is evidence
that this effort may even affect tribal courts’ understandings of
their own tribal customs.50 The most compelling evidence of this
syncretism, however, is in the tribal court decisions themselves.
The tribal courts’ doctrines of ICRA, due process, equal protection,
search and seizure, and the like, are familiar to students of
American constitutional law, but also teem with Indian values of
interpersonal responsibility, 51 respect for leaders,52 the community
good,53 and “consensual and egalitarian principles of governance.”54
In short, the benefits that attend a regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters seem to outweigh the costs under the
ICRA. The case law suggests that the ICRA is a successful example
of creating commonality through shared texts while permitting
heterogeneous interpretations that support diverse local cultures.
II. CREATING ANALOGOUS COMM UNITY -BASED COURTS FOR NON INDIAN COMM UNITIES
A. Overview
Although tribal courts and the ICRA are products of the unique
experience and status of Native Americans, there is a doctrinal
basis for creating “community-based courts” on behalf of non-Indian
communities located on federal property that would be almost
functionally identical to tribal courts. The community-based courts
would be the virtual equivalents of tribal courts insofar as they
would be local tribunals empowered to construe due process, equal
protection, and the like, with virtually no federal or state court
review. Like tribal courts, the community-based courts would be
located in federal enclaves, where homogeneous communities could
50. Id. at 526-27 (discussing Begay v. Navajo Nation, 15 Indian L. Rptr. 6032 (Navajo
1988)).
51. E.g., id. at 514-15 (discussing a case that invoked the concept of k’e, which refers to
“one’s unique reciprocal relationships to the community and the universe,” to construe due
process).
52. E.g., id. at 516-17.
53. E.g., id. at 518-19.
54. Id. at 521 (quoting Rough Rock Cmty. Sch. v. Navajo Nation, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6162,
6165 (Navajo 1995)).
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live governed by their own special local governments. Though only
a handful of communities presumably would be willing to go
through the effort of uprooting themselves and moving to
undeveloped federal land where they could build their ideal
communities, it likely would not be a null set.55
An example might be useful, though this Article will not identify
or defend any particular beneficiaries of these federal enclaves.56
Whereas the Mormon community relocated to the Utah territory in
the 1840s to achieve political and religious autonomy,57 there are no
longer similar opportunities for contemporary Mormon-like
communities that perceive the need to largely cordon themselves off
from general society and run their own lives.
There are four necessary elements of any statute that would
create community-based courts on behalf of non-Indian communities. First, the statute would have to set aside federal property on
which select communities could live58 and create community-based
courts there; this could be done in reliance on the Property Clause
of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2. Second, the statute would have to
withdraw jurisdiction over select constitutional claims that arise
from such enclaves from the United States Supreme Court; this
55. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1071-86 (describing several nineteenth and twentieth-century
groups that have sought to cordon themselves off from general society and build insular
communities). To be sure, presumably only a few groups would seek to build communities
on federal land. This appears to be a good thing, however, for two reasons. First, maintaining
the integrity of the larger American community may not be possible if extensive powers of
self-governance were granted to a large number of subfederal groups. Id. at 1097. Second,
the difficulties of establishing such communities on federal land aids in the difficult
administrative task of determining which groups deserve to have extensive powers of selfgovernance. Hardship ensures only groups deserving extensive powers of self-governance
self-select for it. How so? The reasons for permitting extensive powers of self-governance are
strongest in respect to those groups who believe that absent such autonomy their members
will be unable to fully realize themselves as human beings. Id. at 1091-97. One would expect
that it would only be such deserving ideologues that would be willing to absorb the costs
involved in relocating and building a new community. This is particularly true if, as is the
case with Indian reservations, the federal government did not alienate the federal property
to the communities but only held it in trust for them, thereby eliminating a possible financial
incentive that otherwise might attract undeserving beneficiaries. See infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
56. For such an analysis, see Rosen, supra note 1, at 1089-1106, 1124-25.
57. Id. at 1071-74.
58. Though beyond the scope of this Article, federal Indian law offers one model of the
federal government holding federal lands in trust for the use of special communities. See
FELIX S. COHEN , HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 471-73 (1982).
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could be done pursuant to the Exceptions Clause of Article III,
which grants the Supreme Court “appellate Jurisdiction . . . with
such Exceptions .. . as the Congress shall make.”59 Finally, the
statute would have to withdraw jurisdiction over such claims
from both inferior federal courts and state courts to ensure that
neither set of courts replaced the Supreme Court as the authoritative expositor of the select constitutional claims subject to the
Exceptions Clause.60
The next part of the Article will examine the constitutionality of
such a statute to create community-based courts (CBC Statute)
from the perspectives of Article III, the Exceptions Clause, due
process, equal protection, the Suspension Clause, and the
Establishment Clause. It will conclude that the constitutionality of
the CBC Statute would turn on several normative and empirical
considerations.
B. Creating the Community-Based Courts
Two issues arise in relation to the creation of the communitybased courts: pursuant to what enumerated power could Congress
act to create them, and would their creation run afoul of Article III
or other constitutional limitations?
1. The Property Clause
Congress could rely on its powers under the Property Clause of
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 to create community-based courts on
federal lands within the borders of the United States.61 The clause
grants Congress plenary power to legislate in federal lands,62 and
59. U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
60. In addition, there may be prudential limitations that Congress may wish to place on
the community-based courts’ interpretive freedom. For example, Congress could disallow
community-based courts from engaging in Re-standardizing. See infra notes 233-36 and
accompanying text.
61. It reads “[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
. . . .” U.S. CONST . art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The word “territory” long has been understood to be
equivalent to the word “lands.” See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
62. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976) (Property clause grants Congress
complete power over federal property); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30
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Congress has utilized the Property Clause to create “territorial
courts” (also known as Article IV courts) in the U.S. territories.63
Congress could even purchase land from states for the settlement
of special communities because Congress’s plenary power under the
Property Clause extends to federal land that had once been part of
a state.64
Community-based courts would not be nearly as unique as they
might at first sound, as there are other federally created “local”
courts in the United States today. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has upheld Congress’s creation of non-Article III
courts in the District of Columbia65 to adjudicate “matters of strictly
local concern” for a geographical enclave with “particularized needs
and warranting distinctive treatment.”66 Similarly, federal courts
have upheld Congress’s power under the Property Clause67 to create
Courts of Indian Offenses on Indian reservations68 that have
jurisdiction to hear both private and criminal law claims.69 Nor
(1940) (“The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.
‘And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress
to determine.’”) (quoting Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 527 (1911) (footnote omitted)).
63. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-65 (1982);
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
64. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 537 & n.4, 539 (1938) (land purchased by
the federal government from a state for the purpose of settling a community qualifies as
federal property for purposes of the Property Clause).
65. Congress, however, did not rely on Article IV’s Property Clause for this but on its
powers under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524, 619 (1838).
66. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973) (upholding creation of special
non-Article III courts for special geographical area); see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
76 (noting that Palmore upheld creation of special non-Article III court for distinctive
“geographic areas”). Although Congress relied on its powers under Article I, Section 8, Clause
17 rather than the Property Clause to create the non-Article III courts for the District of
Columbia, see Kendall, 37 U.S. at 619, Congress’s powers under both clauses in respect to
creating courts appear to be similar. The Court has consulted Congress’s power to create
territorial courts under the Property Clause for the purpose of identifying the scope of
Congress’s court-creating powers under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17. Palmore, 411 U.S. at
402-03. Relatedly, the Court has drawn an equivalence between Congress’s powers to create
territorial courts and its powers to create legislative courts within the United States. Ex
parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 456 (1929).
67. E.g., McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539 (Congress regulates Indians on federal lands
pursuant to its powers under the Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2).
68. Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636, 639-40 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 222 (1959) (assuming the constitutionality of Courts of Indian Offenses).
69. 25 C.F.R. § 11.101-103 (2001).
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could it be successfully claimed that community-based courts could
not be given the jurisdiction to hear constitutional matters, for it is
well-established that non-Article III local courts may entertain
constitutional claims.70
2. Article III
The next question is whether constitutional limitations external
to the Property Clause would render creation of community-based
courts unconstitutional. Article III, the most likely foe of such an
effort, would not pose an obstacle. The most direct support for
this conclusion comes from case law that has withstood Article III
challenges to Congress’s powers to create Article IV territorial
courts.71 These cases, however, predate the Court’s modern Article
III jurisprudence, and therefore, a complete analysis of the Article
III implications of Article IV community-based courts requires an
independent examination under contemporary Article III doctrine.

70. Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 586 (1976) (concluding that “the federal territorial . . . courts generally had jurisdiction
to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of territorial
law”). In fact, the Court in Flores de Otero considered the argument that the territorial court
had exclusive jurisdiction over claims concerning constitutional violations. It concluded in the
negative on the basis of statutory interpretation, never suggesting that exclusive jurisdiction
would be constitutionally problematic. Id. at 594-97.
71. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (upholding Congress’s
powers to create territorial court, under the Property Clause); see generally Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64-65. For a trenchant criticism of Canter, see DAVID P. CURRIE , THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT : THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1789-1888), at 120-22
(1985). Nonetheless, Canter is unlikely to be overturned because it is longstanding, wellestablished precedent that has been heavily relied upon. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV . L. REV . 915, 922 n.35
(1988) (noting Canter’s “entrenched historical status and the statutory practice justified by
its authority”). Furthermore, the Court recently affirmed Canter’s reasoning. Palmore, 411
U.S. at 403.
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Article III jurisprudence72 identifies two general categories of
Article III protections—“personal” and “structural”—and invasion
of either will render a non-Article III court unconstitutional.73
Personal protections refer to an individual’s “right to have claims
decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government.”74 This personal protection,
however, may be waived by litigants75 who “consent” to having a
matter litigated by a non-Article III tribunal.76 Waiver can be either
express77 or constructive.78 Waiver can be effectuated by actions
72. Although contemporary Article III doctrine has been refined largely in the context
of litigation challenging Article I courts, see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836-37 (1986), Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
583-85 (1985); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 50, 84, the doctrine should carry over
seamlessly to the context of Article IV community-based courts. After all, what is significant
vis-à-vis Article III is the creation of a non-Article III court, not upon which provision
Congress relied to make it (except to the extent Congress relies on a constitutional provision
that postdates Article III and is understood as implicitly amending it, cf. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635-36 (1999)
(Eleventh Amendment does not limit Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), which, of course, is not the case with Article III)). Indeed, the relevance of case
law from the territorial courts context to the context of Article I courts has been explicitly
recognized in the case law. E.g., Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 456 (1929) (noting
that when considering the issue of the constitutionality of an Article I court, the Court relied
upon a case involving a territorial court and stated that “while that case related to lands in
a Territory, there can be no real doubt that the same rule would apply were the lands in a
State”). Similarly, the Court frequently speaks of “legislative” courts to refer both to Article
I and Article IV courts. See, e.g., id. at 451; see also Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 (noting
“three situations in which Art. III does not bar the creation of legislative courts,” which
includes territorial courts).
73. E.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936-37 (1991).
74. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
75. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936 (“We have previously held that litigants may waive their
personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil trial. The most basic rights of
criminal defendants are similarly subject to waiver.”) (citation omitted).
76. E.g., id. (“There is no constitutional infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury
selection to a magistrate when the litigants consent.”).
77. E.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 849 (finding “express waiver” of right to Article III
adjudication).
78. E.g., id. at 849-50 (finding an “effective waiver” of the right to proceed in state or
federal court to pursue a private right of action where federal regulations indicated that the
CFTC was empowered to adjudicate all counterclaims “aris[ing] out of the same transaction
or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint”). Indeed, all
of the cases cited to by the Court for the proposition that parties can waive even their “most
basic [constitutional] rights” involved circumstances where parties’ attorneys failed to assert
objections at the trial level and thus likely were examples of constructive waivers, i.e.,
instances where the parties (mostly criminal defendants) were not in fact aware that they
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undertaken in advance of the dispute and cannot be withdrawn
later at the time of lawsuit.79 In the context of community-based
courts, it should be the case that both members and nonmembers
of the community can waive their rights, although the criteria for
determining waiver may vary as between the two.80 As a result, the
personal protections of Article III offer no doctrinal obstacle to
community-based courts insofar as they serve individuals who have
consented, either expressly or constructively, to having their
litigation heard in such courts.81
With respect to Article III’s so-called “structural” protections, the
Court has strongly suggested, though has not yet definitively
concluded, that these cannot be waived.82 The analysis that follows
assumes such protections cannot be waived.83 Structural protections
are a species of separation of powers doctrines; they are the
protections that are necessary to guard the “role of the independent
judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.”84 The Court likewise has characterized these as protections
against “congressional attemp[ts] ‘to transfer jurisdiction [to nonwere waiving their rights. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936.
79. Waivers are not a subset of res judicata, for waivers of constitutional rights have been
upheld even where no trial has occurred. E.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
(upholding waiver of criminal trial by guilty plea).
80. The validity of the points concerning nonmembers is illustrated by federal Indian law,
under which a person who is not a member of a tribe can undertake prelitigation acts that
give tribal courts jurisdiction over her such that she is required to litigate in the tribal court
notwithstanding her desire at the time of litigation to have her case heard in a state or
federal court. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1959) (holding that a nonIndian owner of store on reservation is not permitted to litigate action to collect for goods
sold on credit outside of tribal court). Although federal Indian law is a highly idiosyncratic
field of law, its sui generis character does not undermine the lessons it can teach vis-à-vis
generic waiver principles.
81. Although the details of what would qualify as constructive consent are beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting that federal Indian law once again offers an
instructive model. See, e.g., id. (non-Indian obligated to litigate private law claim in tribal
court).
82. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937 (noting question not yet decided). Language in the previously
decided case of Schor, however, suggests that structural protections cannot be waived. Schor,
478 U.S. at 850-51 (“To the extent this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the
parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the
parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject matter jurisdiction beyond the
limitations imposed by Article III, § 2.”).
83. Should this assumption prove untrue, the structural analysis would be a precise
reproduction of the waiver argument provided immediately above in the text.
84. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985).
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Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional
courts”85 and for “preventing ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement
of one branch at the expense of the other.’”86 In determining
whether a statute runs afoul of these structural protections, the
Court most recently has “declined to adopt formalistic and
unbending rules . . . . [I]n reviewing Article III challenges, [the Court
has] weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed
determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role
of the federal judiciary.”87 In particular, the Court looks to
the extent to w hich the “esse ntial attributes of judicial powe r”
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated,
and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirem ents of Article III. 88

Although not completely free of doubt, it is likely that
community-based courts would not run afoul of Article III’s
structural protections under these standards. Though it is true
that the community-based courts within the enclaves would be
exercising the “range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts,”89 the Court has made clear that no single
factor alone is determinative. The inquiry instead would turn on the
“practical effect” of having limited numbers of community-based
courts.90 Analyzed from this perspective, the community-based
85. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (quoting National Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, J., dissenting))) (second alteration in
original).
86. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)).
87. Id. at 851.
88. Id. Prior to Thomas and Schor, by contrast, the Court in Northern Pipeline sought
to create a bright-line rule for Article III. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70-73 (1982).
89. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
90. Id. That the analysis above in text turns on the presence of only a limited number of
community-based courts is not constitutionally problematic for “slippery slope” concerns. In
Schor, the Court explicitly rejected such an argument, holding that “we decline to endorse
an absolute prohibition on such jurisdiction out of fear of where some hypothetical `slippery
slope’ may deposit us.” Id. at 852. In short, the Court in Schor explicitly eschewed a bright-
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courts should pass muster because they pose little danger of
encroaching upon the judiciary from a separation of powers
perspective if, as the analysis here assumes, only a limited number
of enclaves with community-based courts are created.91 Under such
circumstances, the “essential attributes of judicial power” are still
reserved to Article III courts insofar as their jurisdiction remains
unchanged, except in cases arising from a limited number of
geographical enclaves.92 This understanding of the doctrine would
explain why Courts of Indian Offenses do not offend Article III.93
Also relevant to the analysis of Article III’s structural protections
are “the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III.”94 It is here that the normative
reasons for creating community-based courts become doctrinally
germane. Elsewhere I have suggested that there are particularly
strong arguments for granting communities significant powers of
self-government when the failure to do so threatens to destroy
communities whose presence does not destabilize the larger
national polity.95 Others have advanced similar claims.96 Such
normative arguments for granting significant powers of selfgovernance thus are doctrinally relevant to analyzing the
constitutionality of community-based courts under Article III.
3. Due Process
Another potential doctrinal objection is that the CBC Statute
would violate due process because it lodges the litigation of
line rule approach to Article III jurisprudence and instead adopted a fact-specific, case-bycase approach that looks closely at “practical effect.”
91. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
92. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
93. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959) (assuming constitutionality of such
courts); Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636, 639-40 (10th Cir. 1991) (upholding constitutionality
of Courts of Indian Offenses).
94. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
95. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1091-1106, 1126. There is a second implication of the
observation made above in the text that is relevant to analyzing structural protections:
Because only a few communities require such powers of self-governance to survive, there
would be a need to create only a limited number of community-based courts. For this reason
there would be little “practical effect” with respect to diminishing the judicial powers that
reside in Article III courts.
96. See supra note 3.
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constitutional issues in non-Article III courts. Though closely
related to the Article III analysis discussed above, this is a distinct
issue. The notion would be that due process itself demands that
certain legal claims be heard in legal tribunals that have the lifetenure and other protections that Article III affords.97 Such a
challenge would fail, however, because it is well-established that,
with respect to even constitutional claims, due process demands no
more than—and indeed frequently does not even require98 —that
parties have access to some judicial tribunal;99 the tribunal need not
be an Article III court.100 Proceeding on the stricter view that due
process would require access to some judicial tribunal in respect of
the type and range of constitutional issues that would be directed
to community-based courts, this requirement of due process would
suggest that the tribunal that heard the constitutional claim would
have to be more than just judicial in name but would need to have
basic judicial attributes that provide “fair” process.101 Any Article IV

97. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87-88 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that
due process might be a constitutional obstacle to the creation of a non-Article III tribunal
even where Article III is not).
98. Indeed, the existence of such doctrines as sovereign immunity, the political question
doctrine, and the public rights doctrine would appear to establish definitively that due
process does not necessarily require access to a judicial tribunal even when a constitutional
matter is at issue. RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL ., HART AND WECHSLER ’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 375 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that “no Supreme Court case squarely
holds that there is a constitutional right of access to a judicial forum in every case involving
a constitutional claim,” and suggesting that the aforementioned doctrines counsel against
such an absolutist view of due process); see, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987) (finding no Bivens remedy for constitutional torts in limited contexts even though such
a holding effectively precluded plaintiff any effective remedy); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 452 (1929) (noting that “claimants have [no] right to sue on [public rights claims]
unless Congress consents; and Congress may attach to its consent such conditions as it
deems proper, even requiring that the suits be brought in a legislative court”).
99. Although it is true that “under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement
of due process is a requirement of judicial process,” Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), “[t]he due process clause does not guarantee a lower federal court adjudication
of a federal claim any more than does article III.” Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM . & MARY L. REV . 605, 628 n.57 (1981).
100. E.g., Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 586 (1976) (holding that constitutional claims can be adjudicated in Article IV
courts).
101. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 178 (1994) (noting that “‘a fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process’”) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).
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community-based courts accordingly would have to be created with
such properties.
It is worth noting that the case law teaches that the procedures
in non-Article III courts need not mirror what is constitutionally
required in Article III courts.102 Whereas a full discussion of
specifically what would be required by due process is beyond the
scope of this Article, the relevant point for present purposes is
that creating community-based courts that had certain judicial
attributes that would guarantee their general fairness is not an
impossible burden to satisfy. 103 Furthermore, what presumably
would matter would not be the judicial attributes on paper but in
action. In short, what would matter would be that the communitybased court operated like a tribunal with basic judicial attributes.
The empirical examination of the ICRA regime is relevant to
understanding that creating such fair tribunals is possible. Because
the tribal courts operate with the attributes of judicial tribunals,104
it is reasonable to conclude that community-based courts could as
well. If, on the other hand, the tribal court regime had radically
failed, that would have erected a strong, even if not an absolute,
presumption against such a possibility.
4. Equal Protection
Another possible challenge to the CBC Statute is that it violates
equal protection insofar as it creates special tribunals on behalf of
some communities. The statute, however, would readily satisfy the
applicable low-level rational scrutiny test. Indeed, in several other
contexts federal courts have understood that general federal
courts may not be capable of discerning the needs of idiosyncratic
communities and accordingly have upheld against challenge, and in

102. E.g., id. at 179-81 (holding that due process does not require that military judges
have fixed length of service); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973) (holding that
due process does not require that judge in legislative court conducting criminal trial must
have life tenure).
103. Requiring judicial attributes in the community-based courts would not undermine
the purpose driving such courts’ creation, for allowing communities to authoritatively
construe select constitutional provisions does not turn on the absence of judicial attributes.
104. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 522-78.
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some cases even strengthened, local courts that cater to such
communities.105
5. Establishment Clause
A final possible challenge would be that the CBC Statute would
violate the Establishment Clause if community-based courts were
to be created on behalf of a religious community. Such a challenge
would fail, however, because the CBC Statute is tantamount to
“neutrally available state aid” that can benefit both religious and
nonreligious insular communities, and such neutral benefits do not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.106
C. Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Inferior Federal Courts
It is well-established that Article III itself imposes no limits
on Congress’s power to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts.107 Congress has plenary power with respect to the
105. The recognition that general courts may not be capable of discerning the needs of an
idiosyncratic community has led the Supreme Court both to limit the jurisdiction of general
federal courts, see, e.g., Weiss, 510 U.S. at 166-69 (concluding that ordinary federal courts are
without “competence” to make what are essentially professional military judgments and
holding that enlisted persons may not bring Bivens actions against their superior officers in
federal courts), and to expand the jurisdiction of the community tribunals to adjudicate
matters affecting the community. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71
(1978) (holding that federal courts have only limited subject matter jurisdiction with respect
to ICRA claims because “resolution of statutory issues under [the ICRA] . . . will frequently
depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better
position to evaluate than federal courts”). Similarly, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
upheld against an equal protection challenge the American Samoa territory courts, whose
rulings could not be reviewed by Article III courts. The appellate court cited to the reasons
adduced by the district court—“American Samoa’s relatively small size” and “its desire for
autonomy in local affairs”—and added that the scheme was a rational means to respect
Samoan traditions concerning land ownership, which was communal in nature. Id. at 386.
The Congress’s policy of respecting traditional land ownership “could be frustrated if the
High Court’s judgments in such cases were reviewed by one of the circuit courts of appeal,
which are Article III courts but which lack expertise in Samoan law and culture . . . .” Id. at
387.
106. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
107. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no question of
the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the
United States.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Having a right to
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jurisdiction of inferior federal courts108 and so could limit the
jurisdiction of such courts at will, subject only to constitutional
limitations external to Article III.
D. Disallowing Review by Article III and State Courts
The next core attribute of the CBC Statute whose
constitutionality requires detailed demonstration is the absence of
review by any Article III tribunal or state court of the communitybased courts’ constitutional and other determinations. This
component of the statute actually implicates four distinct
constitutional questions. First, does Congress have the power under
the Exceptions Clause of Article III to strip the Supreme Court of
appellate power to review the constitutional interpretations of
community-based courts? Second, does Congress have the power to
eliminate state court jurisdiction over cases heard by the
community-based courts? Third, would the failure to provide review
by the Supreme Court or any other Article III or state court violate
due process? Fourth, and finally, would the Suspension Clause109
demand that federal courts retain jurisdiction to hear habeas claims
resulting from community-based court judgments that result in the
custody of persons?
1. The Exceptions Clause
The first question is whether Congress has the power to
withdraw the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction from cases
arising from discrete geographical enclaves. The question turns on
Congress’s powers under the Exceptions Clause, which grants the
Supreme Court “appellate Jurisdiction .. . with such Exceptions and
regulations as the Congress shall make.”110 Under the case law, and
according to the bulk of commentators, the answer likely would be
yes. The Supreme Court has directly ruled on the limits of
Congress’s powers to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate
prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies.”).
108. Lauf, 303 U.S. at 330; Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449.
109. U.S. CONST . art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
110. U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2.
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jurisdiction in only two cases, Ex parte McCardle111 and United
States v. Klein,112 and neither case precludes such a use of the
Exceptions Clause. Showing this requires a full treatment of each
case.
The petitioner in Ex parte McCardle was a newspaper editor in
custody pending trial for libel. The petitioner appealed a lower
court’s denial of his habeas petition, which had been premised on
the theory that the Act he was accused of violating was
unconstitutional.113 After the Supreme Court heard oral argument,
but before it had decided the case, Congress enacted a statute that
withdrew the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a class of cases of
which the petitioner’s was a part. In McCardle, the Court directly
confronted the question of whether this withdrawal of jurisdiction
under the Exceptions Clause was a legitimate exercise of Congress’s
power. Relying on the Exceptions Clause’s language, the Court
found in the affirmative and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Stated the Court, “[w]e are not at liberty to inquire into
the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power
under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”114
111. 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
112. 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
113. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN . L. REV . 895, 904-05 (1984); see also
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ . L. REV . 229 (1973).
114. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514. To be sure, in the last paragraph of the opinion the Court
obliquely noted that the statute in question only affected appeals from circuit courts and thus
did not wholly divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases.
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in
question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus,
is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not except from that
jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It
does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.
Id. at 515; see CURRIE , supra note 71, at 306 (making this point). The Court’s interpretation
of the Exceptions Clause, however, did not appear to turn on this belated observation, which
is best understood as commentary concerning the Suspension Clause rather than the
Exceptions Clause. These points appear to be confirmed by a case decided later that year in
which the Court reiterated that Congress’s 1868 legislation had not attempted to deprive the
Supreme Court of the appellate jurisdiction over habeas cases that had been granted by the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1868). Consistent with the view
that Ex parte McCardle construes the Exceptions Clause as a grant of plenary power to
Congress, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Ex parte Yerger that “[w]e are not at liberty
to except from [our appellate jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law,” id. at 102
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In Klein, the second case in which the Exceptions Clause was
construed, the Court held that Congress had overstepped its
powers under the Clause. The facts are complex but vital to an
understanding of the holding. Plaintiff Klein was the administrator
of an estate who had sued in the Court of Claims for proceeds of a
sale of property due the decedent. The decedent, a man by the name
of Wilson, had been loyal to the Confederacy during the Civil War
and during that time had abandoned certain cotton. An 1863 Act
of Congress confiscated abandoned property, like Wilson’s, in
insurrectionary districts but also provided that any person who had
not been disloyal and could prove ownership of abandoned property
was entitled to receive the proceeds of the abandoned property’s
sale. The Act further recited that the President could grant “pardon
and amnesty.”115 Wilson had received a pardon in 1864 and died
the next year. Klein, Wilson’s administrator, filed a claim with the
Court of Claims to recover proceeds from the sale of Wilson’s
abandoned cotton. Relying on the pardon to establish loyalty, the
court found in Klein’s favor. The Government appealed, and during
the appeal’s pendency Congress enacted legislation that declared
in substance that no pardon would be admissible in evidence in
support of any claim against the United States in the Court of
Claims. The statutory provision further stated that a presidential
pardon was conclusive proof of disloyalty and that claims based on
pardons should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The
Government accordingly urged the Supreme Court to remand the
(emphasis added), thereby suggesting that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over habeas
matters would have been eliminated had Congress “expressly excepted” the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. Id. at 106; see also id. at 98 (“The appellate jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court]
is subject to such exceptions, and must be exercised under such regulations as Congress, in
the exercise of its discretion, has made or may see fit to make.”); CURRIE , supra note 71, at
307 (noting that “no such construction of the statute would be adopted without a clearer
statement from Congress”). On the other hand, the Yerger Court stated later in the opinion
that denying appellate jurisdiction in the circumstances pertaining in the case would have
left the person in custody “wholly without remedy” of habeas corpus, noted the constitutional
requirement that habeas not be suspended, and stated that these considerations “would
strongly persuade against the denial of the jurisdiction even were the reasons for affirming
it less cogent than they are.” Yerger, 75 U.S. at 103. Insofar as the Court in subsequent case
law has spoken of Congress’s plenary powers under the Exceptions Clause powers without
qualification, see infra note 127, the Court’s dictum in Ex parte Yerger is best understood as
a commentary on the requirements of the Suspension Clause rather than a limitation on
Congress’s Exceptions Clause powers, just as are the final sentences in Ex parte McCardle.
115. Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863, 12 Stat. 820.
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case back to the Court of Claims with instructions that the case be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.116
The Klein Court determined that the new statute was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s “exceptions” and “regulations”
powers. Although the Court’s reasoning is not a paragon of clarity,
its holding appears to have been driven by separation of powers
concerns and to have turned on the confluence of several factors.117
First, the Court held that Congress overstepped the boundary
between legislating and adjudicating in attempting to legislate a
“rule of decision” by, among other things, requiring the Court to
look for certain facts and then directing how the Court was to
construe them.118 Second, the Court gave weight to the fact that the
statute sought to deprive the Court of jurisdiction in a case with
respect to which the Court already had begun to exercise
jurisdiction.119 Third, the Court relied on the fact that application
of the statute would have financially benefitted the government.120
116. Klein, 80 U.S. at 136-44.
117. For a recent approach that also understands Klein to be a separation of powers
holding, see Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO . L.J.
2525, 2529 (1998); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies,
86 GEO . L.J. 2537, 2538-45 (1998) (critiquing Sager’s suggestion).
118.
[T]he language of the [statute] shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold
appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. . . .
[T]he denial of jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court of Claims, is
founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending,
prescribed by Congress. The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point;
but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to
cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.
....
The court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment,
such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary.
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power.
Klein, 80 U.S. at 145-47; accord Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995)
(discussed infra note 126 and accompanying text).
119. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146 (“[T]he denial of jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court
of Claims, is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending,
prescribed by Congress.”) (emphasis added). Klein is inconsistent with Ex parte McCardle in
this respect, for the McCardle Court gave no weight to the fact that the matter over which
the Supreme Court lost its appellate jurisdiction was a cause pending. See supra text
accompanying note 114.
120. Klein, 80 U.S. at 147 (“Can [Congress] prescribe a rule in conformity with which the
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As if to underscore the determinative role played by these unique
circumstances, the Klein Court stated that if the statute “simply
denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there could
be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of
Congress to make ‘such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction’
as should seem to it expedient.”121
Two recent cases not concerning the Exceptions Clause have
provided commentary on Klein that may shed light on the Clause’s
meaning. In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,122 the Court
upheld a statute that required the Court of Claims to review the
merits of a takings claim by the Sioux Nation without taking
account of the res judicata effect of a previous Court of Claims
decision in which the government had prevailed.123 Addressing the
argument that the statute in question ran afoul of Klein’s principle
concerning the separation of powers between adjudication and
legislation, the Court distinguished Klein on the ground that “the
proviso at issue in Klein had attempted to ‘prescribe a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way’ [whereas the statute in
Sioux Nations only] waived the defense of res judicata so that a
legal claim could be resolved on the merits.”124 Further, observed
the Court, in Klein “Congress was attempting to decide the
controversy at issue in the Government’s own favor.”125 Similar to
Sioux Nations, the Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
explained Klein as standing for the principle that Congress cannot
“prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the
government in cases pending before it.”126
court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its
decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favorable
to the suitor? This question seems to us to answer itself.”).
121. Id. at 145.
122. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
123. Id. at 389-98. Thus, the case did not involve a congressional attempt to limit the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in its opinion the Court addressed the
argument that the statute in question ran afoul of Klein insofar as that case stood for the
principle that there must be a separation of powers between adjudication and legislation. Id.
at 402-05. Insofar as this principle appears to be inseparable from Klein’s holding with
respect to the Exceptions Clause, the Court’s holding in Sioux Nation sheds light on its
understanding of Klein’s holding with regard to Congress’s Exceptions Clause powers.
124. Id. at 405 (quoting Klein, 80 U.S. at 146).
125. Id. at 405.
126. 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995).
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These cases exhaust the Supreme Court’s Exceptions Clause
holdings.127 On its face Ex parte McCardle appears to say that,
consistent with the Exceptions Clause’s plain language, there are
no limits to Congress’s powers under the Clause. Klein undoubtedly
cuts back McCardle to some extent, but how much? A close reading
of Klein, in conjunction with Sioux Nations and Plaut, suggests
that the Court cannot use the Clause to prescribe rules of
decisions, particularly where doing so benefits the government
and (perhaps) where the Court already has begun to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case. But apart from these constraints,
the cases suggest that “simply den[ying] the right of appeal in a
particular class of cases”128 would not be unconstitutional. And so
conclude the bulk of scholars—including Herbert Wechsler, Gerald
Gunther, Paul Bator, and John Harrison129—who cite the plain
language of the Exceptions Clause, the case law, history, 130 and
127. In a more recent case, the Court held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 did not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to hear a petition for habeas
corpus and consequently did not require a pronouncement concerning the Exception Clause’s
scope. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661-63 (1996). Several other cases have discussed the
Exceptions Clause in dicta. Virtually all echo the perspective that the Congress has plenary
power in respect of making exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. E.g.,
The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1881) (“Not only may whole classes of cases be kept
out of the jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions may be subjected to reexamination and review, while others are not.”); Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. 250, 254
(1865) (“But it is for Congress to determine how far, within the limits of the capacity of this
court to take, appellate jurisdiction shall be given, and when conferred, it can be exercised
only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by law.”); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
321, 327 (1796) (“If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot
exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it.”); see
also Gunther, supra note 113, at 903-04 (citing more cases).
128. Klein, 80 U.S. at 145.
129. E.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REV . 1030, 1039 (1982); Gunther, supra note 113, at 908-10; John Harrison, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64
U. CHI. L. REV . 203, 209 (1997) (identifying as the “traditional” view the understanding that
“[t]he congressional power to make exceptions from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is, in
itself, limited only insofar as some limitations might be so large as no longer to constitute
exceptions” but that “the exceptions power is subject to any external constitutional
limitations that may apply”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM .
L. REV . 1001, 1005 (1965).
130. For example, Gerald Gunther notes that until 1914 the Congress had not given the
Supreme Court the appellate jurisdiction necessary to ensure that the Court would provide
interpretations of federal law that would be uniform across the country. Until 1914, Supreme
Court review was available only when a state tribunal denied a federal statutory or
constitutional claim. Review was unavailable, however, when a federal claim was sustained,
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dicta,131 to conclude that Congress has plenary power under the
Clause to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction,132 subject only to constitutional constraints external to
the Exceptions Clause (such as due process and equal protection).
To be sure, virtually all of these scholars argue that, as a
normative matter, Congress should not exercise its plenary power
to make exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.133 But these
scholars’ policy prescriptions have no bearing on the CBC Statute,
for no scholar has contemplated using the Exceptions Clause in the
manner deployed by the model statute; they have commented on
use of the Clause to effectuate a nationwide divestiture of the
Court’s appellate powers134 to express disapproval of Supreme Court
decisions,135 not deployment of the Clause to create geographical
even if the state court construed the federal claim differently than had the Court. Gunther,
supra note 113, at 906-07.
131. Id. at 904 n.39 (citing cases).
132. There is a second group of scholars who argue that Congress does not have the power
under the Exceptions Clause to legislate so as to undercut the “essential functions” of the
Supreme Court. E.g., Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review:
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV . 929, 932-36 (1982);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV . L. REV . 17, 45-55 (1981). Although
the CBC Statute is contrary to the spirit of these scholars’ approaches, it is unclear whether
it would undercut the Court’s “essential functions” insofar as there would be only a limited
number of community beneficiaries. See supra note 55.
133. According to Herbert Wechsler, for example, any such exercise of the Exceptions
Clause is “more theoretical than it is real.” Wechsler, supra note 129, at 1007. Bator similarly
adopts the position that although “Congress may have the authority to carve out subject
matters and withdraw them from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, [it] should not
do so, not only because they represent bad policy but because they violate the structure and
spirit of the instrument.” Bator, supra note 129, at 1039. John Harrison is one of the few
scholars who does not argue that exercise of the Exceptions Clause power necessarily would
be bad. Harrison, supra note 129, at 250-53, 255 (noting that “Congress’s power over
jurisdiction is . . . among other things, a check on the judiciary” and taking issue with the
notion that the Constitution’s drafters had distrust for state courts, which would be the most
likely entities responsible for construing the Constitution in the event Congress made
exceptions to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction).
134. Wechsler, for example, expressly states that “when I speak of withdrawal I mean, of
course, complete elimination of all cognizance of cases of the kind.” Wechsler, supra note 129,
at 1006. The other scholars similarly have assumed that any withdrawal of the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction naturally would entail complete withdrawal with respect to the
excepted constitutional provisions. E.g., Bator, supra note 129, at 1041; Gunther, supra note
113, at 910-12.
135. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH . & LEE L. REV . 841,
846 (1975); Gunther, supra note 113, at 910-11; Wechsler, supra note 129, at 1007
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enclaves to aid idiosyncratic communities whose special needs
require adaptations of select constitutional doctrines that are
approved of by Congress as they apply to general society. In any
event, as these scholars themselves have argued, undesirability and
unconstitutionality are two different things.136 That is to say, even
if the use proposed here were unattractive to them, such a
normative judgment, in their view, would have no bearing on the
statute’s constitutionality.
2. State Court Jurisdiction and the Property Clause
In the context of discussing Congress’s powers under the
Exceptions Clause, scholars have noted that even if Congress had
power to eliminate all federal court jurisdiction over select
constitutional provisions, Congress could not abolish state courts’
jurisdiction to hear such claims.137 This congressional disability
would present no obstacle to the CBC Statute because the
community-based courts would be situated on federal land, and it
is well-established that the Congress, acting pursuant to the
Property Clause, has the power to oust state court jurisdiction and
require that adjudications arising within land of exclusive federal
jurisdiction be handled by non-Article III courts created by the
federal government.138

(explaining the Exceptions Clause as a part of a system designed to “preserve a measure of
political control” over the Court).
136. E.g., Bator, supra 129, at 1039; Gunther, supra note 113, at 905, 910-11.
137. Bator, supra note 99, at 628 (noting that “Congress can validly limit the jurisdiction,
or even the existence, of the lower federal courts; but it cannot control the jurisdiction of the
state courts of general jurisdiction so as to foreclose the vindication of a federal constitutional
right”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV . L. REV . 1362, 1401 (1953).
138. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (Arizona state courts without jurisdiction over
civil suit between non-Indian and Indian where cause of action arose on Indian reservation
and noting that “if the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly
conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive”); United States v. McGowan,
302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938) (noting that states are without “sovereignty” in areas of exclusive
federal jurisdiction); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 521-28, 561 (1832) (striking
down Georgia law that forbade Cherokees from holding courts and enacting law in lands
formally part of Georgia that had been granted to Indians by federal government).
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3. Due Process, Article III, and the Suspension Clause
The next question is whether the CBC Statute’s withdrawal of
appellate review from all Article III courts and state courts is
unconstitutional even if withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction from
the Supreme Court and eliminating inferior federal court and state
court jurisdiction each on their own would be lawful. Due process,
Article III, and the Suspension Clause are the relevant doctrinal
considerations.139 As this subsection shows, due process would not
render the community-based courts per se unconstitutional under
the proposed CBC Statute, but the regime of multiple interpreters
established by the Statute might be violative of due process if in
practice the community-based courts did not undertake their duties
in a “good faith” fashion. An informed prediction concerning how
community-based courts will conduct themselves accordingly is
doctrinally relevant. To the extent tribal courts and communitybased courts are analogous,140 the ICRA study is germane to judge
the constitutionality of the CBC Statute.
The difficult doctrinal question posed by the CBC Statute is
whether due process, Article III, or the Suspension Clause requires
the possibility of Article III review of a non-Article III court’s
federal law determinations. Let us focus first on due process and
Article III. Such a review requirement, it could be said, flows from
the case law insofar as all the legislative court schemes upheld by
the Supreme Court have allowed for at least limited review in
Article III courts.141 Even if Article III required limited review by an
Article III court, the benefits of multiple authoritative interpreters
139. It is also possible that this aspect of the CBC Statute could be claimed to violate
implicit “structural” aspects of the Constitution. See infra notes 247-82 and accompanying
text.
140. See infra notes 283-319 and accompanying text (considering the extent of the analogy
between the two regimes).
141. E.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1985) (Article
III review of arbitrator’s “‘findings and determinations’ for fraud, misconduct, or
misrepresentation” and “review of constitutional error” satisfies due process); Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 447 (1929) (allowing only for certiorari petitions to the United
States Supreme Court). The one possible exception is tribal courts: except where a party is
in detention, federal courts are without jurisdiction to review tribal court determinations of
the federal law of the Indian Civil Rights Act. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
I will not, however, rely only on tribal courts to establish the principle above in text so as to
preempt the argument that tribal courts are wholly sui generis.
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would be largely unaffected because statutes providing only
exceedingly weak review by Article III courts have been upheld; in
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., for example,
there was judicial review only for “fraud, misconduct, or
misrepresentation.”142 Review of this sort would not undermine the
benefits that the community-based courts are intended to
confer—provided, that is, that an Article III court did not equate
community-court deviations from ordinary doctrine with “fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation,” an issue that will be examined
below.143
There is firm ground for concluding, however, that a complete
absence of Article III review in the CBC Statute would not offend
due process or Article III. There are several contexts analogous to
the community-based courts where there is no Article III review of
federally created non-Article III courts’ applications of federal law.
Most analogously, Courts of Indian Offenses are federally created
tribal courts on reservations that have jurisdiction to hear private
civil and criminal matters,144 including claims based on federal
law.145 These courts’ decisions can be appealed to the appellate
division of the Courts of Indian Offenses, but the appellate
division’s decisions cannot be appealed to the Department of the
Interior or to Article III courts.146 Though not created by the federal
government, tribal courts are another example; federal courts are
without jurisdiction to review tribal court interpretations of the
ICRA where no party is in detention.147 Military courts are yet
another illustration. Before 1984, Article III courts were wholly
without jurisdiction over cases tried before the non-Article III
federally created military courts, and since 1984 there still has been
142. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592.
143. See infra notes 172-286 and accompanying text.
144. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.103 (2001). The courts have jurisdiction over classical private law
claims. E.g., id. §§ 11.500-.501 (civil actions), 11.802 (judgment against a surety).
145. E.g., id. §§ 11.400-.449 (criminal offenses).
146. Id. § 11.200(d) (“Decisions of the appellate division are final and are not subject to
administrative appeals within the Department of the Interior.”). The sole exception is that
federal courts have jurisdiction under the ICRA’s habeas provision when parties are “in
custody.” E.g., Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation, 168 F.3d 1207,
1208-09 (10th Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text. As a result, there
is no appellate recourse to Article III courts for most cases tried before Courts of Indian
Offenses.
147. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
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no Article III review for most cases tried before military courts.148
Although the Supreme Court has not heard a due process challenge
based on the absence of Article III court review to Courts of Indian
Offenses or military courts, the longstanding presence of these
courts provides strong support for the proposition that there need
not be Article III review of federal law determinations made by nonArticle III courts created by the federal government.149
Further support for the proposition that neither due process nor
Article III demands the possibility of Article III review of a nonArticle III court’s federal law determinations can be found in the
views of scholars like Henry Hart, Paul Bator, Gerald Gunther, and
John Harrison, all of whom understand that state courts (i.e., nonArticle III tribunals) would be the courts of last resort for
constitutional interpretation were Congress to deprive the Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts of jurisdiction over a category of
constitutional provisions.150 Under these scholars’ views, due
process and Article III require the possibility of court review, but
not necessarily Article III court review.151 This is not inconsistent
with the case law concerning Article I courts, which when
considering the requirements of due process typically speaks of the
need for judicial review, not federal judicial review.152 Under this
148. The only Article III review is discretionary review by the Supreme Court of cases
reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals. 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-867 (2000); Fallon, supra note
71, at 973. The Court of Military Appeals itself has jurisdiction over a subset of cases heard
in military courts—cases in which the “sentence is one of dishonorable discharge, bad
conduct discharge, or confinement of one year or more.” Id. at 973 n.319. The Supreme Court
is without jurisdiction to review any case in which the Court of Military Appeals has refused
to exercise review and is expressly precluded from reviewing “any action of the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces in refusing to grant a petition for review.” 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a).
149. The instructiveness of Courts of Indian Offenses for present purposes is not
diminished by the fact that federal constitutional limitations are not applicable to tribal
governments. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). This is because the Constitution is
applicable to the federal government, and it is the federal government that created the
Courts of Indian Offenses and that accordingly could be said to be violating the due process
rights of Indians, who are American citizens, if due process indeed required appellate
recourse to an Article III court when a non-Article III federal court makes a decision based
on federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000) (Indians are citizens of the United States).
150. Bator, supra note 99, at 627-29; Gunther, supra note 113, at 915-16; Harrison, supra
note 129, at 250-53; Hart, supra note 137, at 1401.
151. Gunther, supra note 113, at 915 (“It is widely agreed that due process does assure
access to some judicial forum in many circumstances. Traditionally, however, due process
has not been thought to require access to a federal judicial forum.”); see also supra note 150.
152. E.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985) (speaking
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understanding, the CBC Statute would not be unconstitutional
insofar as the entity that makes the final determination would be
a court, albeit a non-Article III court and a nonstate court.
If legislators were of the view that due process, Article III, or
good sense required that there be some federal review emanating
from outside the community-based court, but still wished to avoid
Article III review so as to foster community-based courts’
independence, an option would be to provide deferential executive
review.153 An instructive example of this type of review can be seen
in a decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that held due
process to be satisfied by federal executive review of the
determinations of an Article IV territorial court even though the
relevant executive official, the Secretary of the Interior, specifically
refused to serve as an “appellate court” and limited his review of
the constitutional claim that had been presented to him to the
question of whether the Article IV court had committed “‘a clear
abuse of judicial discretion.’”154 In support of this understanding of
of “whatever judicial review might be required by due process”); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, the constitutional
requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.”).
153. This would not run afoul of the rule of Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792),
under which “Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of
the Executive Branch.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (emphasis
added).
154. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day
Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). Hodel
upheld against a due process challenge the federal legislation that created territorial courts
in American Samoa, which provided no review of the High Court’s decisions by an Article III
tribunal. Instead, aggrieved parties could petition the Secretary of the Interior of the United
States to reverse the High Court’s decisions. In dicta, the court stated that “[w]hen Congress
creates a territorial court apart from Article III, it matters not whether it makes no provision
for, delegates to the Executive Branch, or delegates to the Judicial Branch the power to
review its rulings . . . .” Id. at 385. The court added, however, that “[a]t most, it might be
necessary to provide somewhere, if not on review then by way of collateral attack, an Article
III forum in which to raise a constitutional claim.” Id. at 385 n.67.
The appellant in Hodel had purchased approximately 300 acres of land in American Samoa
in 1953. In 1979, it filed a trespass action in the High Court of American Samoa. The High
Court concluded that the Church did not have title to the land because the 1953 deed was
invalid and because the Church had not acquired the land through adverse possession. The
Church asked the Secretary of the Interior of the United States to intervene, claiming that
the High Court’s decision was based on a “perverse reading of the law” or an “arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power” that consequently deprived the Church of due process and took
its property without compensation. Id. at 379. The Secretary responded that he would not
serve as “an appellate court, superimposed over the duly constituted judiciary” and that he
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due process’s requirements is the Supreme Court’s approval of
administrative schemes in which Article III courts are wholly
without power to review the agency’s “application of legal standards
to facts,”155 for the only check on the administrative agencies in
such instances is via executive review. Under this view, the CBC
Statute would satisfy due process’s demands if the statute provided
that a federal executive official was empowered to review the
decisions of the community-based courts for clear abuse of
discretion.156 Such limited review would not undermine the very
would intervene only upon a finding of “clear abuse of judicial discretion,” which he did not
find in the case at hand. Id. at 378-79. The Church then sued the Secretary in Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of his decision
not to review the High Court’s decision and arguing, inter alia, that “the total absence of
appellate review by an independent tribunal . . . leav[es] the potential for error and abuse
totally unchecked” and thereby violates due process. Id. at 384.
The federal lawsuit in Hodel itself thus was an instance of collateral attack, that is, the
plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Interior, claiming that he failed to keep the High Court
within constitutional bounds. Id. at 387. Under this scheme, the non-Article III court is
subject to executive rather than judicial review, and the executive officer in turn is subject
to judicial review. In reviewing an equal protection challenge later in the opinion, the court
noted that constitutional guarantees are not fully applicable in the territories. Id. at 386.
This does not appear to have informed the court’s due process analysis, however.
155. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583 (“Many matters that involve the application of legal
standards to facts and affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action with
limited or no review by Article III courts.”) (emphasis added).
156. Though not necessary for purposes of the instant due process analysis, it merits
noting that the executive official’s check on the community-based courts might be even
greater by virtue of the fact that the judges may constitute “inferior officers” who accordingly
would be subject to the Appointments Clause and the executive control that the Clause
entails. Judges in military tribunals and the Tax Court have been deemed to be inferior
officers. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169 (1994) (holding that military judges are
“inferior officers” for purposes of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, because they “exercis[e]
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam)); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880-82 (1991)
(providing test for distinguishing “inferior officers” from “mere employees” whose
appointment need not be made pursuant to the Appointments Clause). Under these
standards, it could be argued that judges in community-based courts, charged as they would
be to authoritatively construe the Constitution, qualify as “inferior officers.” In such a case,
Congress still would likely be able to provide that appointments to the community-based
courts be made by the local communities, subject to limited review by the executive, since
there are strong policy reasons for giving the communities a role in selecting their judges and
in so doing Congress would not be increasing its own powers at the expense of the executive
branch. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (holding that separation of powers is not
an issue where Congress does not attempt to “gain a role in the removal of executive officials”
in addition to impeachment and conviction); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (similar). It is possible, however, that the community-based judges
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purpose behind creating such courts, as long as the executive
official understood that the mere fact that a community-based court
adopted a varying application of a constitutional provision would
not per se qualify as a “clear abuse of discretion.”157
Finally, even on the assumption that due process or Article III
generally requires that parties have the option of Article III review
of interpretations of federal law by non-Article courts, the CBC
Statute still might not run afoul of due process. Parties always can
waive their right to judicial review, so accordingly there is no
reason to believe that parties cannot constructively waive any such
right by electing to join and remain in, or to transact with, a special
community located on federal land.158 As in federal Indian law,
persons not belonging to the community could be said to waive any
rights to judicial review in an Article III court when they undertake
activities that subject them to the community-based court’s subject
matter jurisdiction.159
Finally, let us consider what, if any, review requirements might
be demanded by the Suspension Clause. To begin, it is virtually
certain that the local governments in federal enclaves would be
deemed to be agents of the federal government.160 As such, the
Suspension Clause, which provides that “The Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,” would apply, as would
the federal habeas statute.161 This would mean that federal courts
presumptively would have collateral review over those cases

would not be considered “inferior officers.” After all, state court judges who would be
responsible to construe constitutional provisions in the event Congress exercised its
Exceptions Clause power would not thereby become “inferior officers.” Similarly, tribal court
judges are not deemed inferior officers despite their responsibility for authoritatively
construing the ICRA. This would allow the communities a larger role in selecting their
courts’ judges.
157. See infra notes 172-286 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
159. Indian law once again provides a helpful model, for outsiders who interact with tribal
governments also effectively waive any right to have their federal, quasi-constitutional ICRA
claims reviewed by an Article III court, except to the extent that the outsiders are in
“detention.” See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
160. Territory of Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903); DAVID P. CURRIE , THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT : THE SECOND CENTURY , 1888-1986, at 65 & n.75
(1990) (noting that Justice White’s concurrence “did not seem to deny that the action
complained of in Mankichi was that of agents of the federal government”).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994).
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decided by community-based courts that resulted in “custody.”162
Nevertheless, such review would not eviscerate the powers of selfgovernance that the CBC Statute seeks to grant. To begin, habeas
review would not be available in the many cases where there is no
custody. Further, insofar as the guarantee of habeas review says
nothing about the substantive standards that should be used to
determine whether custody violates the Constitution, habeas review
would not undermine the very point of community-based courts so
long as reviewing courts understood that community-court
variations from ordinary constitutional doctrines would not be
unconstitutional as a per se matter.163 In fact, habeas review would
only make the analogy between tribal courts and community-based
courts tighter: the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) contains a habeas
provision that grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to
review tribal court determinations that result in the “detention” of
persons164 even though tribal courts are permitted to construe ICRA
provisions in accordance with tribal customs and needs.165 Habeas
review under the ICRA has not undermined the extent to which the
ICRA has provided tribes important room for self-governance,166
and there is no reason that habeas review over community-based
courts need undermine the self-governance the CBC Statute is
intended to provide any more than has habeas review over tribal
courts.
Moreover, it is possible that Congress could structure the CBC
Statute so that habeas review over community-based courts could
be eliminated altogether should the communities situated in the
federal enclaves so desire. Just last term in the case of I.N.S. v. St.
Cyr,167 three Justices in dissent argued that the Suspension Clause
162. Id. § 2241(c); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963) (providing broad
interpretation of custody); see also Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).
163. See infra notes 172-286 for a discussion of the appropriate boundaries of communitybased court interpretive freedoms.
164. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66-70 (1978) (holding that the
ICRA’s habeas corpus provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1994), provides the exclusive basis for
federal court subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the Act). Federal courts have
looked to habeas “custody” caselaw to construe the ICRA’s “detention” requirement. See, e.g.,
Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation,168 F.3d 1207, 1208 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied 528 U.S. 815 (1999).
165. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55.
166. See generally Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 511-78.
167. 533 U.S. 289, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001).
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proscribes the temporary elimination of habeas review but does not
preclude “permanent repeal.”168 The other six Justices specifically
refused to answer this question.169 Whether permanent elimination
of habeas review over a class of cases would violate the Suspension
Clause accordingly is an open question, but one about which three
Justices already have intimated their views in the affirmative.
Furthermore, the Suspension Clause question addressed in St. Cyr
is a more difficult question than the CBC Statute would present.
After all, St. Cyr concerned the question of whether habeas review
can be eliminated in respect of persons who ex ante desire such
review. The question posed by the CBC Statute, by contrast, would
be whether habeas review can be set aside for persons who ex ante
desire to be part of a political community with respect to which
federal courts do not have such review powers. In other words, the
CBC Statute presents the issue of waiver. Many constitutional
rights can be waived.170 The reasons for respecting waivers are
particularly strong in circumstances like this where waiver does not
result in permitting a government official to perform an act that
might be the sort that we as Americans believe the Constitution
should not countenance;171 although we presumably would not want
to allow a prisoner to waive her Eighth Amendment rights and elect
to be hanged and quartered by the government, respecting the
waiver of habeas simply means that federal courts will not hear
168. Id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J.). The
three Justices primarily relied on the historical understanding of “suspend” for purposes of
interpreting the Clause. Id. at 2299-2300. Although the dissent stated that “suspen[sion]”
historically included “temporarily but entirely eliminating the ‘Privilege of the Writ’ for a
certain geographic area or areas,” id. at 2299 (emphasis added), such geography-based
suspension did not include instances where the locality itself desired the elimination of the
Writ, which would be the case under the CBC Statute. Furthermore, such geography-based
suspensions were not permanent, as would be suspensions pursuant to the CBC Statute.
169. Justice O’Connor also dissented, but she did not join the part of Justice Scalia’s
opinion concerning the scope of the Suspension Clause because she did not think the question
had to be answered to resolve the case. Id. at 2293 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Five Justices,
including Justice Kennedy, concluded that whether Congress could completely preclude
federal courts from reviewing a pure question of law “would give rise to substantial
constitutional questions” under the Suspension Clause, and so construed the statutory
language at issue in a manner that did not implicate the question. Id. at 2279, 2287.
170. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
171. Cf. DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 785 (6th ed. 2001) (asking: “Shouldn’t
the Bill of Rights be understood as a set of restrictions imposed by the American people on
what their government officials can do regardless of the idenity of the person acted upon?”).
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certain sorts of cases. In other words, a waiver of constitutional
rights that results in the absence of governmental action may be
less problematic than a waiver that would permit the government
to affirmatively undertake an action.
III. THE NE W COMM UNITY -BASED COURTS ’ INTERPRETIVE
FR EE D OM
Even if Congress has the power to create community-based courts
whose decisions are free from Article III review, there remains the
question of what if any interpretive freedom such courts would
enjoy. After all, the absence of judicial review says nothing about
what law must be applied. Even if the Supreme Court does not have
appellate review over the community-based court’s decision, the
Supreme Court has provided an interpretation of, for example, what
due process or search and seizure requires. Would not the
community-based court be required to apply the Supreme Court’s
interpretation within its community?
The answer is no. Section III.A. explains why novel interpretations by community-based courts would not violate the canons
of judicial hierarchy, or qualify as per se “abuse of discretion” under
executive review.172 Community-based courts could not have the
identical range of interpretive freedom enjoyed by tribal courts,
however, and Section III.B. identifies the limitations on their
interpretive independence that several lines of case law would
require. Section III.C. defends community-based courts’ interpretive
freedom against the more general structuralist critique that a
regime of multiple authoritative interpreters of the Constitution
would be contrary to the nature of American constitutionalism.

172. For the same reason, deviation from ordinary doctrine would not qualify as “fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct” were Congress to decide to subject community-based
court decisions to deferential review so as to address possible due process concerns, see supra
notes 141-43 and accompanying text, nor would they be unconstitutional under habeas
review; see supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
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A. Doctrines That May Be Thought to Limit Community-Based
Courts’ Interpretive Freedom
Community-based court deviations from Supreme Court interpretations call into question several doctrinal constitutional issues.
Assuming that due process requires deferential executive review,
would not a community-based court’s disregard of Supreme Court
precedent be the clearest possible case of abuse of discretion?
Even if due process does not require executive review, would not
variations in constitutional protections across locales violate the
guarantee of equal protection?173 Finally, should there be habeas
review, would not any community-based court’s unique interpretation be unconstitutional as a per se matter on the simple
ground that the interpretation was not perfectly coterminous with
the doctrine previously announced by the Supreme Court?
It also might be argued that allowing multiple contemporaneous
interpretations of a constitutional provision would violate the
canons of judicial hierarchy that have been established in several
foundational Supreme Court cases. In Cooper v. Aaron, for example,
the Court asserted that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution,”174 and the Cooper decision
has been understood to stand for the proposition that other
governmental actors are bound by the Court’s exposition of the
Constitution.175 One also might suggest that the empowerment of
173. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-11 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that different
standards across counties for determining whether a vote had been cast violates equal
protection).
174. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The Supreme Court has reiterated this principle in cases
subsequent to Cooper. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (noting the
“responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO . L.J. 217, 225 n.18 (1994) (citing
other cases). Cooper built on Marbury v. Madison’s assertion of the power of judicial review,
see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 153 (1803), but went farther than Marbury
insofar as the opinion declared that the Court’s interpretive authority trumping other
governmental actors extended beyond the decided case. These claims regarding the Court’s
position in the interpretive hierarchy have been subject to intense scholarly debate. See infra
note 175.
175. For present purposes I will explain why the CBC Statute would not run afoul of this
principle of Cooper. It should be understood, first, that this principle is merely dictum.
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REV . 43, 52-53 (1993). Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe this
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community-based courts to offer their own interpretations of
constitutional provisions would run afoul of observations made
by the Court in the 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.176 The
Martin Court held that States cannot serve as independent
and authoritative interpreters of the Constitution on account of
“the importance, and even necessity, of uniformity of decisions
throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the
purview of the constitution.”177 Otherwise, continued the Court, “the
constitution of the United States would be different in different
states; and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public
mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable . . . .”178 Would not community-based courts create the
same problems as would the independent state court interpreters
proscribed by Martin?
The attack against community-based courts can be sharpened
further still. In the wake of City of Boerne v. Flores,179 one might
ask how Congress can claim the power to authorize variances from
what the Supreme Court has said the Constitution means. The
Supreme Court in City of Boerne held that Congress had exceeded
its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 (RFRA).180 The RFRA purported to permit government to
substantially burden religious exercise only for compelling reasons
and only via the least restrictive means. These requirements,
however, were stricter than what the Court had declared the Free
Exercise Clause required in the decision of Employment Division,

dictum to be wrong. MARK TUSHNET , TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 632 (1999); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting
the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV . 371 (1988); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right
This Time?, 61 TUL . L. REV . 1071 (1987); Merril, supra, at 59-78; Paulsen, supra note 174,
at 343-45.
176. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
177. Id. at 347-48.
178. Id. at 348. For an elaboration of this, see JOSEPH STORY , COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 169-172, at 128-30 (abridged ed. 1833). For a
critique of this aspect of Martin’s holding, see Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 48285.
179. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
180. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
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Department of Human Resources v. Smith.181 City of Boerne consequently poses the following question with respect to the CBC
Statute: If the Court struck down the RFRA on the ground that
Congress does not have the power to “interpret the Constitution”182
in a manner that mandates conditions that the Court said the Free
Exercise Clause does not require, how can Congress create nonArticle III courts that have the power to independently interpret
the Constitution?
This section of the Article first considers the challenge to the
CBC Statute posed by City of Boerne, and then considers if and how
the statute would square with Cooper, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
executive review, and equal protection.
1. City of Boerne
Although superficially similar, the RFRA was fundamentally
different from the CBC Statute. RFRA, concluded the City of
Boerne Court, “contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance.”183 The CBC Statute
affects separation of powers and federalism values very differently,
if at all. First, with respect to federalism, by purporting to prohibit
state actions that substantially burden religious practices absent
compelling reasons, when the applicable constitutional test forbade
only non-neutral laws, the RFRA burdened the states in two
respects: “in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden
on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general
regulatory power . . . .”184 The CBC Statute plainly does neither.
There is no foreseeable litigation burden that the CBC Statute
would impose on states; if anything, litigation against states likely
would decrease insofar as dissatisfied residents of the special
communities on federal land would not sue states or localities but
their community-based governments. Similarly, the CBC Statute
would not curtail any general state regulatory powers, but instead
181. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (rejecting such strict scrutiny for free exercise claims and
upholding a neutral, generally applicable law not supported by a compelling governmental
interest).
182. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528.
183. Id. at 536.
184. Id. at 534.
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affect activity in federal lands over which the states are without
inherent power.185 For these reasons, it is most accurate to say that
the CBC Statute would not affect federalism concerns at all insofar
as the legislation only would affect federal property, not the states.
This helps to explain another significant distinction between the
RFRA and the CBC Statute: whereas Congress’s powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are confined,186 Congress
has extraordinary plenary powers under the Property Clause, one
of the bases of the CBC Statute.187
There are two reasons why the CBC Statute likewise does not
pose anything akin to the separation of powers concerns found in
City of Boerne. First, at issue in City of Boerne according to the
Court was whether Congress could define its own constitutional
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
provision states that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of” the Fourteenth
Amendment.188 Whereas the Employment Division v. Smith decision
had held that state actions that substantially burdened religious
practices absent compelling reasons were not necessarily unconstitutional, Section 5-based RFRA purported to prohibit such state
actions.189 Congress thus decided the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and then used that understanding as a predicate for
creating enforcement legislation under Section 5, and in that sense
could be said to have been “defin[ing] its own powers.”190 The CBC
Statute presents no such difficulties. It could be enacted pursuant
185. The federal government’s power over federal lands is “complete.” Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); see also supra note 62 (citing to other cases that stand for
this principle). States accordingly have no inherent power over federal property located
within their borders, though the federal government may delegate power to the states.
186. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33 (Congress has power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment only to enact “remedial, preventive legislation” that must meet a
test of “proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to
be achieved”).
187. See supra note 62.
188. U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 5.
189. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16.
190. Id. at 529. Whereas the separation of powers implications of such a power are
obviously grave, this does not mean that RFRA necessarily was unconstitutional. For
thoughtful post-Boerne commentary arguing that the RFRA should have been upheld, see
David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: City of Boerne v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP . CT . REV . 31; Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV . 743 (1998).
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to expressly provided congressional powers (the Property and
Exceptions Clauses) whose scope the Court already has defined. For
this reason, the statute could not plausibly be said to implicate
Congress’s ability to define its own powers.191
There is a second crucial distinction between the RFRA and the
CBC Statute with regard to separation of powers. The RFRA in
effect sought to reverse a Supreme Court decision that Congress
viewed as mistaken;192 it purported to change the applicable rules
nationwide under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
pursuant to Congress’s view of what free exercise demanded across
the country. The impetus behind the CBC Statute presumably
would be very different. Congress could indeed think that although
a constitutional doctrine works well as a general matter across
general society, the specific needs of a discrete community, whose
needs the Supreme Court has not assessed, demand the possibility
of differential application of a constitutional principle in the
geographically discrete area where the community is situated. This
pinpointed rather than nationwide focus is reflected in the CBC
Statute’s reliance on the Property Clause. These doctrinal and
motivational differences between the RFRA and the CBC Statute
are fundamental in respect to what City of Boerne teaches about
separation of powers. Assuming the creation of only a limited
number of community-based courts,193 the CBC Statute would
neither reflect congressional dissatisfaction with contemporary
Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence nor in effect seek to
alter the applicable constitutional rule across the country. For these
reasons, the CBC Statute is distinguishable from the RFRA.

191. It might be argued that by creating community-based courts Congress could
indirectly define its own powers insofar as it is possible that the Supreme Court could strike
down a piece of general legislation that a community-based court would uphold. As discussed
below, however, my analysis assumes that the community-based courts would engage in good
faith interpretation. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. This would mean that
Congress would not have any real power to define its own powers in a City of Boerne manner
even if a community-based court upheld legislation that the Supreme Court did not.
192. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-16.
193. See supra note 55.
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2. Cooper, Martin, and “Abuse of Discretion”
A community-based court’s election to apply substantive rules
that differed in some respects from those adopted by the Supreme
Court would not violate the dictates of Cooper v. Aaron194 or Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee,195 nor would it constitute an “abuse of discretion”
for purposes of executive review or create a doctrine that was
unconstitutional as a per se matter insofar as it was not identical
to the doctrine previously announced by the Supreme Court. This
is so because the community-based court would not be deciding that
the Supreme Court’s interpretation was incorrect, but just that the
constitutional principle requires a different application with respect
to the confined geography where the community at issue is situated.
This would not violate the dictates of Supreme Court supremacy
because it essentially is a determination by the community-based
court that there is no relevant Supreme Court precedent vis-à-vis
the question presented. Determining whether precedent addresses
the situation at hand is something that governmental bodies do all
the time, and a good faith determination that there is no controlling
precedent does no violence to the rules of judicial hierarchy.
Indeed, there is precedent for non-Article III governmental actors
to provide highly contextualized applications of constitutional
provisions—which permit or proscribe what is otherwise disallowed
or permitted in general society—on the basis of a good faith belief
that the circumstances before them fall outside of general rules
announced in the Supreme Court’s opinions. Consider the military.
The executive and legislative branches often regulate in ways that
plainly would be unconstitutional outside of the military context on
the view that the needs of the military community196 require that
194. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
196. The Court typically speaks of the military “community” when it discusses the
deviations from ordinary constitutional doctrines that occur on military bases. E.g., Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (referring to the “different character of the military
community”). As I have stated elsewhere:
It is not mere happenstance that the Supreme Court refers to the needs of the
military community when it creates [constitutional] nonuniformities. This is
because the nonuniformities are deemed to be necessary to inculcate the
distinctive norms that lead members of the military to think and act in the
common ways that constitute the military into a group that merits the
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the Constitution’s provisions be given applications that differ
from those in general society. 197 For example, unlike ordinary
government officials, military officials may prohibit speech that
is merely “intemperate, . . . disloyal, contemptuous and disrespectful,”198 may enact prior restraints,199 and may ban private
citizens’ political speech from military bases.200 The decisions by
these non-Article III governmental officials to authorize these acts
are not inconsistent with Cooper or Martin (or, for that matter,
with City of Boerne) because the military officials did not suggest
that the Court had been incorrect in its identification of the
constitutional rule that is applicable across general society.
Instead, the officials concluded that the parties being regulated
and the locus of the activities rendered the situation sufficiently
different from the circumstance that the Supreme Court had faced
that the case law was not controlling. Far from being aberrational
or problematic, such case-by-case analogical reasoning lies at the
core of common law methodology, 201 a methodology that well
describes the development of constitutional doctrine itself.202 As
discussed further below, however, this way of understanding
community-based courts’ determinations implies certain limitations
on their interpretive freedom.203 Interestingly—and perhaps
appellation of “community.”
Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1154. For a more complete discussion
of these issues, see id. at 1152-56.
197. Although constitutional provisions are applicable to the military, see, e.g., Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981), it is black letter law that “the different character of the
military community and of the military mission requires a different application of
[constitutional] protections.” Parker, 417 U.S. at 758; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment
grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations
designed for civilian society.”). The Court has forthrightly acknowledged that the
“fundamental necessit[ies]” of the military “may render permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.” Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
198. Parker, 417 U.S. at 739, 759.
199. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation requiring
members of the service to obtain approval from commanders before circulating petitions on
Air Force bases).
200. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976).
201. See CASS R. SUNSTE IN , LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 62-100 (1996).
202. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV . 877 (1996) (discussing common law interpretation methods and their relation
to the development of constitutional doctrines).
203. See infra notes 214-46 and accompanying text.
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counterintuitively—the scope of permissible deviations would be
largely independent of whether a judge in a community-based
court adhered to an originalist or a nonoriginalist interpretive
philosophy. 204
There is a solid doctrinal foundation for importing to the CBC
Statute the lesson found in the military context that governmental
actors apart from Article III courts may identify instances where
circumstances require atypical applications of constitutional
principles. As is the case of the constitutional clauses that give
Congress power with respect to the armed forces, the Property
Clause has been held to grant Congress extraordinary plenary
powers.205 Indeed, the Supreme Court has looked to Congress’s
powers regarding the military when analyzing the outer limits of
Congress’s powers under the constitutional provisions that grant
Congress powers over federal property. 206 So, parallel to military
officials, the judges who sit on the community-based courts could be
expected to have the power to determine that constitutional
provisions apply differently in relation to their communities.
This conclusion should not be affected by the fact that there is
Supreme Court review in the military context207 but that there
would be none (or very little, as previously discussed) under the
CBC Statute. This difference between the community-based courts
and the military is due to the Exceptions Clause, which permits
Congress to delegate final authoritative interpretation of select
constitutional questions to entities apart from the Supreme Court;

204. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 62.
206. E.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 404 (1973) (looking to military courts
to answer question of Congress’s powers with respect to the District of Columbia pursuant
to the Territory Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17). In Northern Pipeline, which
concerned Congress’s powers to create Article I courts pursuant to its general powers, the
Court treated military courts and territorial courts as discrete exceptions to general Article
III principles, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70
(1982), but subsequent case law has discarded this categorical approach, see Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985) (“[P]ractical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III.”), and
adopted a jurisprudence that draws lessons concerning Article III from the cases that
Northern Pipeline identified as discrete exceptions. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583 (looking to
Palmore, which involved Congress’s powers regarding the District of Columbia, with respect
to Article III challenge to creation of general Article I court).
207. See supra note 148.
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Congress has not exercised its Exceptions Clause power in the
military context but would do so under the CBC Statute. The
presence or absence of ultimate Supreme Court review is
analytically distinct from a governmental actor’s temporally prior
power and responsibility to determine whether the circumstances
at hand are sufficiently different to render the decided case law offpoint and justify an uncommon application of a constitutional
provision. To assert otherwise would be to suggest that limitations
on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction diminish other governmental
actors’ powers and responsibilities to construe the Constitution.
There is no basis for such a view. Indeed, the law from the political
question doctrine suggests otherwise, for the absence of Supreme
Court jurisdiction to interpret constitutional provisions under the
political question doctrine has not been held to deprive the
nonjudicial branches of the power and responsibility to interpret.208
Just the opposite is true: the absence of Supreme Court review has
been understood to empower other governmental actors to become
authoritative interpreters.209
In short, the Property Clause allows for the possibility that nonArticle III actors can determine that discrete communities on
federal property require a different application of constitutional
principles, and the Exceptions Clause entails the possibility that
the final arbiter of what particular constitutional provisions
demand may not be the Supreme Court. A legal regime that drew
upon both potentialities of the Property and Exceptions Clauses,
but that still respected due process and Article III concerns (e.g.,
the CBC Statute), indeed may have qualities both strange and

208. See infra notes 264-70 and accompanying text (discussing political question doctrine).
In any event, the benefits of decentralized interpretation of select constitutional provisions
would not be undercut significantly if the CBC Statute provided, or if the Constitution were
deemed to require, that the community-based courts’ determinations be subject to review by
the Supreme Court under the type of highly deferential standard that is applicable to the
military. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (holding that the Court
must give “particular deference” to the judgment of military authorities when reviewing
constitutional challenges to military regulations) (quoting Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25,
43 (1976)). The effect of such highly deferential review is that the Court has upheld
significant variations in what the Constitution has been deemed to require as between
general society and the military community. For a fuller development of this point, see
Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1141-49, 1152-56, 1161-64.
209. See infra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
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unfamiliar. Such novelty, however, should not in and of itself
render the statute unconstitutional.
3. Equal Protection
Variations in constitutional protections as between general
society and the federal enclaves would not be an equal protection
violation. When Congress acts pursuant to the Property Clause, it
may treat federal property “differently from States so long as there
is a rational basis for its actions.”210 This is true even if the affected
parties on the federal property are citizens of the United States.211
Thus even though the Equal Protection Clause would be fully
applicable in the federal property,212 the question would be whether
there is a rational basis for varying the application of constitutional
protections as between general society and the special communities
in the federal enclaves. The constitutionality of varying requirement would thus turn on two queries: (1) the normative question of
whether there is a rational basis for believing that accommodating
insular communities qualifies as a legitimate governmental
interest, and (2) whether the creation of community-based courts
with such interpretive freedoms is rationally related to such a
governmental interest.
The CBC Statute should readily pass this test. The normative
arguments for accommodating insular communities213 would
appear to be strong enough to satisfy the deferential legitimategovernmental-interest test. Furthermore, the positive experience of
tribal courts under the ICRA suggests that creating communitybased courts with such interpretive powers is rationally related to
achieving the end of empowering select insular communities.

210. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (per curiam).
211. Id. at 653 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. Harris, for example, concerned Puerto Rico, and “the equal protection guarantee of
either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment” as applicable in Puerto Rico. Id. at 653
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601
(1976)). In contrast to Puerto Rico, the Constitution has been held not to apply to some
territories. E.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1904) (unincorporated
territories such as the Philippine Islands).
213. See supra note 3.
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B. The Limitations on Interpretive Freedom
As discussed above, community-based courts would not be
required to apply constitutional provisions in the same way as the
Supreme Court. This would not run afoul of the multifarious
constitutional doctrines that establish the rules of judicial
hierarchy because the community-based courts would not be
determining that the Supreme Court’s interpretations were
incorrect, but instead would be providing highly contextualized
applications of constitutional principles. This does, however, create
some limitations on community-based courts’ interpretive freedoms
not shared by tribal courts.
The limitations are best understood in relation to a simple model
for characterizing deviations from ordinary Supreme Court
doctrines.214 The model shows that there are five possible
approaches to past Supreme Court pronouncements that an
authoritative interpreter of a constitutional provision can take.
Community-based courts would be disabled from taking two of
these approaches. Tribal courts, it so happens, have not relied
heavily upon these two. Insofar as tribal courts have realized
important benefits under their regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters, it would follow that imposing these restrictions on
community-based courts need not unduly constrain them.215
1. Mapping the Development of Constitutional Doctrine
The five approaches to past Supreme Court pronouncements can
best be appreciated in relation to a model that describes the state
of development of any particular constitutional doctrine. The model
builds on the commonly appreciated distinction between “rules” and
“standards.”216 Standards are legal edicts that describe the trigger
of legal consequences in “abstract terms that refer to the ultimate
policy or goal animating the law.”217 Rules, by contrast, are legal
214. What follows draws heavily from Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 489-500.
215. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
216. E.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER , PLAYING BY THE RULES : A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE -BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 102-04 & 104 n.35 (1991); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1992).
217. Rosen, supra note 18, at 623.
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edicts that “describe the triggering event with factual particulars
or other language that is determinate within a community.”218
Now to the model. Constitutional provisions typically take the
form of standards that require active interpretation to identify
concretely the actions that are required, permitted, or proscribed in
particular circumstances. The interpretive process can be usefully
conceptualized as involving three steps. Although the steps do not
necessarily correspond to the chronology of the constitutional
provisions’ interpretation,219 identifying them is useful because they
provide a means of assessing the nature and scope of a communitybased court’s deviations from ordinary doctrine.
First, the constitutional provision can be identified with a general
“Goal,” by which I mean a broad-stroke description of what the
provision attempts to accomplish. The Goal sets the parameters
within which subsequent doctrinal development occurs.220 For
example, the Goal of the Fourth Amendment has been identified as
protecting various “personal and societal values” including a “right
to privacy.”221 Although people typically view the contemporarily
understood Goal as inevitable, the Goal almost always is a nonaxiomatic translation of the constitutional provision.222 That is to
say, a different Goal (or Goals) plausibly can be ascribed to the
constitutional provision (and, frequently, have been, as an historical
matter). Understanding these characteristics of Goals is vital to
appreciating the appropriate scope of a multiple authoritative
interpreter’s deviations from ordinary doctrine.
The second step in the process is the creation of a “Legal Test”
to determine whether the identified Goal is met.223 This second
step occurs because the Goal inevitably is too abstract, and
consequently, unworkable for the judiciary’s institutional needs of
having a shorthand method for decision making that identifies as
legally relevant only a subset of the infinite facts that characterize
any given circumstance. The test almost always includes one or
218. Id. at 623.
219. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 490.
220. Id. at 490-91 & nn.42-50. Perhaps counterintuitively, identification of the Goal
frequently is not what happens first in time during the interpretive process. Once the Goal
is identified, however, it affects subsequent doctrinal development. Id. at 490 n.43.
221. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 182-83 (1984).
222. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 490 & n.45.
223. See id. at 490 & n.46.

982

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:927

more “Standards.” For example, the Supreme Court has translated
the previously mentioned Fourth Amendment Goal into a Legal
Test comprised of several Standards that ask whether “the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search” and whether society is “willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.”224 This Legal Test helps
to particularize the Goal, but by deploying Standards such as
“expectation of privacy” and “reasonable,” it still leaves ample
uncertainty as to what concretely satisfies it.
Step three describes what occurs to the Legal Test’s Standard
over time. As the Standard is applied over a series of cases, it
almost always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs because
cases, by their nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As
the cases are decided they become showcases of what, as a concrete
matter, the Standard actually requires.225 Step three’s product is
best identified as a “Rulified Standard.” For example, do people
have a “subjective expectation of privacy” in open fields? The Court
has said no.226 In curtilage surrounded by a high double fence? Not
from a naked-eye observation made from an aircraft, according to
the Court.227
This simple model of interpretation can be graphically depicted
as follows:

224. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (emphasis added).
225. This process of utilizing case law to make standards more concrete is not logically
necessary; some say, for instance, that it does not occur in French law. Barry Nicholas,
Introduction to the French Law of Contract, in CONTRACT LAW TODAY : ANGLO -FRENCH
COMPARISONS 7, 9-10 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989). It is, however, an accurate
depiction of what happens under the United States’ common law method of constitutional
adjudication. Strauss, supra note 202, at 877-906.
226. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
227. Id. at 209-10 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (emphasis added)).
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MODEL OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
Constitutional Provision
9
1.

Goal
9

2.

Standard
9

LEGAL TEST
3.

Rulified Standard

2. Five Possible Approaches to Case Law
A community-based court theoretically could take any of five
possible approaches to past Supreme Court pronouncements.
First, the community-based court could ignore altogether the
federal case law and proceed to construe the provision wholly on
its own. I have called this the “Tabula Rasa” approach.228 The
second approach is the polar opposite of Tabula Rasa: the court
could completely incorporate the federal doctrine to the extent
the doctrine has been developed. This is what I have called
“Incorporation.” Perhaps surprisingly, community-based courts
could be valuable even when they merely Incorporate.229
Third, a community-based court could adopt the Supreme Court’s
Standard but reject the Court’s rulification of the Standard,
instead opting to tailor it to the context at hand. I have called this
“Tailoring.”230 Such context-specific tailoring may require or
proscribe actions that vary from what is required or proscribed
in most other places. To provide an analogy, the United States
Court of Military Appeals has relied on Tailoring to reject Rulified
Standards that are applicable to general society and to adapt the

228. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 492.
229. Id. at 494.
230. Id. at 495.
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Constitution’s application to the military community. For example,
in upholding a warrantless entry into the defendant’s two-person
barracks in the middle of the night against a Fourth Amendment
challenge, the court in United States v. McCarthy231 adopted the
ordinary Standard but employed Tailoring. It held that “a military
member’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the barracks is
limited by the need for military discipline and readiness. . . . ‘[A]n
intrusion that might be unreasonable in a civilian context not
only [may be] reasonable but [may be] necessary in a military
context.’”232
Fourth, a community-based court could adopt the Goal identified
by the Supreme Court but reject the Court’s Standard. I have
dubbed this “Re-standardizing.”233 For example, in Hopi Tribe v.
Lonewolf Scott,234 the Hopi tribal court accepted that the Goal of the
due process void for vagueness doctrine is to ensure that persons
have fair notice of what conduct is criminally sanctionable. But
instead of deploying the ordinary Standard—an objective test that
looks to the mere “possibility of discriminatory enforcement” and
lack of notice235—the court applied a subjective test and analyzed
how the Native American community in question understood the
ordinance and how the tribal authorities had applied it.236
Fifth, and finally, a community-based court could reject the Goal
and put forward its own. I have called this “Re-targeting.”237 Retargeting and Tabula Rasa reject the largest quanta of Supreme
Court precedent and hence allow for the largest deviations from
ordinary constitutional doctrines.
To summarize, the five approaches that a multiple authoritative
interpreter can take can be mapped onto the schematic of doctrinal
development as follows:

231. 38 M.J. 398 (C.M.A. 1993).
232. Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. Thatcher, 28 M.J. 20, 22 (C.M.A. 1989)); see
generally Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1152-56 (“Federal courts
have relied on Tailoring and Re-standardizing to create geographical constitutional
nonconformity in the domain of military law.”).
233. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 496.
234. 14 Indian L. Rptr. 6001, 6005 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986).
235. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1082 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
236. Lonewolf Scott, 14 Indian L. Rptr. at 6005.
237. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 496.
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FIVE APPROACHES TO
SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
(1) Tabula Rasa: ignore Court’s
approach in toto
(2) Incorporation: adopt Court’s
approach in toto

Constitutional Provision
9
Goal ¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶

9
Standard ¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶

9
Rulified Standard ¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶¶

(3) Re-targeting: deviating from
Court’s approach at level of
“Goal”

(4) Re-standardizing; deviating
from Court’s approach at level
of “Standard”
(5) Tailoring: deviating from
Court’s approach at level of
“Rulified Standard”

3. The Limitations
The requirement that community-based courts not interpret
constitutional provisions in a manner that indicates disagreement
with the Supreme Court’s interpretations means that the community-based courts would have to accept the presently understood
Goal, as articulated by the Supreme Court. The subsequent steps
in doctrinal development (creating the Standard and the Rulified
Standard) are the means of realizing the Goal, and a communitybased court’s determination that realization of the Goal required a
deviation from either the Standard or Rulified Standard would not
imply disagreement with the Supreme Court’s interpretations.
Consistent with this, the variations from ordinary doctrine that are
found in the military and in public schools all are created by
deviations at either the level of Standards or Rulified Standards.238
238. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1144-45, 1152-56, 1159-61.
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This would mean that the community-based courts would be
permitted to engage in Incorporation, Tailoring, and Re-standardizing, but not Re-targeting or Tabula Rasa.
Interestingly, this limitation suggests that the scope of deviation
from ordinary doctrine is largely independent of whether a judge for
a community-based court adhered to an originalist or nonoriginalist
interpretive convention. This is true because originalist understandings seldom if ever are expressed at the level of detail
(Standard or Rulified Standard) at which a community-based court
would be permitted to deviate.
Such a limitation would still permit extensive variations from
ordinary constitutional requirements. As mentioned above, all
variations in constitutional requirements that are found in the
military and in public schools are created via Re-standardizing and
Tailoring.239 In fact, the same is true of virtually all variations in
Indian Country.240 The potential for variation can be most dramatically illustrated by considering Tailoring, which is more limited
than Re-standardizing in generating deviations from ordinary
doctrines because Tailoring “rejects”241 a smaller quanta of federal
court precedent than Re-standardizing. In Brown v. Glines,242 for
example, the Supreme Court employed Tailoring in deciding that
prior restraints within military enclaves do not violate the First
Amendment. At issue was the constitutionality of an Air Force
regulation that required service persons to obtain supervisory
approval before distributing petitions. The Court adopted the
ordinary First Amendment Standard and concluded that the
regulations “protect a substantial Government interest unrelated
to the suppression of free expression.”243 The Court came to this
conclusion because it highly contextualized the substantial government interest: “[t]o ensure that [soldiers] always are capable of
performing their mission promptly and reliably, the military
services ‘must insist upon a respect for duty and [] discipline . . . .’”244
239. Id. at 1144-45, 1152-56, 1159-61.
240. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 516-78.
241. By “rejection” I mean a determination that the ordinary teachings of case law are not
applicable to the context at hand, not a determination that the case law as decided upon its
facts was incorrect.
242. 444 U.S. 348, 358-61 (1980).
243. Id. at 354.
244. Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975)). Furthermore, the
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In fact, the Court defined the substantial government interest in
the military context in a manner that completely cut against what
is generally understood to be core First Amendment values of
protecting the exchange of political expression:245 the military
requires the inculcation of “duty” and “discipline,” and this requires
the censorship of ideas that challenge orthodoxy and patriotism.
In short, strongly context-specific use of Tailoring can generate
profound variations. Re-standardizing can create even broader
variations insofar as it deems even more precedent to be inapplicable to the case at hand than does Tailoring.
Furthermore, the tribal court experience suggests that requiring
community-based courts to accept the Goal would not significantly
impede realization of the potential benefits of a regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters. This is because Re-targeting and Tabula
Rasa are not heavily relied upon by tribal courts.246 Because tribes
have been able to realize significant benefits by relying primarily on
Incorporation, Tailoring and Re-standardizing, it stands to reason
that non-Indian communities could as well.
C. Structural Challenges to the Existence of Any Interpretive
Freedom
There is a final possible constitutional challenge to the community courts’ interpretive independence: even if it is not unconstitutional upon a clause-by-clause analysis, the creation of multiple
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution might offend
structural fundaments of the Constitution. It might be argued, for
example, that a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters of

Court explained that the regulations met the second element of ordinary free speech
jurisprudence because they “restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to protect
the substantial government interest.” Id. at 355.
245. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that “[d]iscussion
of public issues . . . [is] integral to the operation of the system of government established by
our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
expression in order to ‘assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.’”) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957)); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“There is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs.”).
246. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 516-78.
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select constitutional provisions is inconsistent as an a priori
matter with the nature of American constitutionalism, if not
constitutionalism generally. In fact, Professors Larry Alexander and
Frederick Schauer recently have argued in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review that there must be one authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution, and that this conclusion inexorably
follows from an understanding of the nature of constitutional law.247
Community-based courts with interpretive independence would
seem to violate squarely this condition and hence undermine
constitutionalism.248 Similarly, Professor Leonard Ratner has
argued that
[t]he Constitution makes us one nation. It is the symbol of our
shared purp oses. If interpretation of that overriding docu ment,
which ma nifests o ur ag reem ent o n lon g term associational
values, varies from state to state, respect for and con fidence in
the docum ent is underm ined. The nature of our governmental
structure and its implications fo r all citizens beco me ind istinct.
Uncertainty and discontent proliferate.249

Although Ratner has phrased his argument in terms of
nonuniformity “from state to state,”250 his logic compels the
conclusion that constitutionalism by its nature requires one
authoritative interpreter because the values he identifies as
metonymic with the Constitution would be undermined regardless
247. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV . L. REV . 1359, 1362 (1997) (defending Cooper v. Aaron’s “assertion
of judicial primacy without qualification”); id. at 1370 (“The normative inquiry, however, and
thus the question of which approach to nonjudicial constitutional interpretation is most
desirable, can only be answered by inquiring into the nature of law and into the functions it
serves.”).
248. On closer look, however, community-based courts might not be problematic even
under Alexander and Schauer’s view. The core of their argument is that the authoritative
settlement and coordination functions served by law, particularly constitutional law, are
what demand a single authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. Id. at 1371-72, 1377-87.
Even assuming as correct their assumption that the central function of the Constitution is
to provide authoritative settlement and coordination, these purposes would not necessarily
be undermined by the presence of a limited number of community-based courts that
exercised the power to construe authoritatively select constitutional provisions within their
enclaves.
249. Ratner, supra note 132, at 941.
250. Id.
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of the governmental levels at which there were contemporaneous
nonuniformity of constitutional interpretation. Thus communitybased courts with independent interpretive powers would appear to
be inconsistent with American constitutionalism as an a priori
matter under Ratner’s account, as well.
Notwithstanding the views of these prominent scholars, and the
likely intuitions of many others, a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters of the Constitution is not a priori inconsistent with
American constitutionalism. To the contrary, there are two distinct
models of multiple interpreters of the Constitution that can be
found in American constitutional law. The more radical of the two
has a strong historical pedigree and makes powerful analytical
sense, but is contrary to some contemporary Supreme Court dicta,
whereas the second model is still good law. The community-based
courts are more similar to the less radical of the two models, and
they do not run afoul of the contemporary dicta. There accordingly
are strong reasons to believe that the CBC Statute would not
violate structural fundaments of the Constitution.
1. The First Model
The first model of multiple interpreters in American
constitutional law has strong historical foundations, but is
inconsistent with some contemporary Supreme Court dicta. Its most
recent advocates include Professors John Harrison, Sanford
Levinson, Thomas Merrill, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and Mark
Tushnet.251 According to these scholars, the Constitution does not
create a regime of judicial supremacy where the Supreme Court’s
interpretations are binding on the other branches of government,
pace the dicta in Cooper v. Aaron. Instead, the Constitution
creates a system of shared interpreters in which the other branches
of the federal252 government have the power, and indeed the
responsibility, to offer their independent interpretations of the

251. See supra note 175.
252. Some scholars have argued that constitutional interpretation is appropriately done
by actors aside from the federal government. E.g., TUSHNET , supra note 175, at 181-82 (the
people); Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH . & LEE L.
REV . 1149, 1188-1201 (1998) (states).
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Constitution.253 Whereas the federal judiciary’s power to resolve
“cases or controversies” includes the power to determine the
applicable rule of law in the case, the judiciary’s interpretations are
not binding on the other branches outside of the decided case. That
is to say, the executive branch has a duty to interpret federal law,
including the Constitution, insofar as it must understand the law
(i.e., have an interpretation of it) in order to execute it. Similarly,
the Congress has a duty to judge its constitutionally granted and
constitutionally limited legislative powers for itself when it
legislates.254
There is strong historical support for this first model, which I
shall label “Inherent Powers.” Thomas Jefferson acted pursuant to
such an understanding when, as President, he directed the
Attorney General to stop prosecutions under the Sedition Act of
1798 and pardoned all who had been convicted under the Act during
the previous administration of President Adams. He later explained
his actions:
The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass
a sentence of fine and imprisonment; because the p ow er was
placed in their hands by the Constitution. But the executive,
believing the law to be uncon stitutional, w ere bou nd to remit
the execution of it; becau se tha t pow er ha s been con fided to
them by the Constitution.255

253. Some of these scholars explicitly acknowledge that their views are inconsistent with
the constitutional doctrine of today. E.g., Paulsen, supra note 174, at 225 (“I make no claim
that the position for which I argue is the doctrine held by the modern Supreme Court. It is
not.”). Their arguments nonetheless are still relevant to the question of whether multiple
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution are incompatible as an a priori matter with
American constitutionalism. Further, the case law that cuts against their position—Cooper
v. Aaron and a series of cases that have reiterated Cooper’s dictum that other branches of
government are bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution—did not
concern the Exceptions Clause and accordingly does not necessarily serve as a doctrinal
obstacle to the CBC Statute. After all, it is possible that the Exceptions Clause is an express
constitutional exception to the ordinary rules of judicial hierarchy. See supra notes 194-209
and accompanying text.
254. E.g., Harrison, supra note 175, at 371-74; see also Paulsen, supra note 174, at 322 &
n.358.
255. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), quoted in
Paulsen, supra note 174, at 255.
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President Jackson propounded a similar understanding of multiple
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution when he explained his
constitutional grounds for vetoing the rechartering of the National
Bank notwithstanding the judgment rendered by the Supreme
Court in McCulloch v. Maryland256 that the National Bank was
constitutional:
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he und erstand s it, and not as it
is un der stoo d by others . . . . The opinion of the judges has no
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent
of both . The auth ority of the Suprem e Court must not, therefore,
be perm itted to co ntrol the C ong ress or the E xecu tive w hen
actin g in their legislative capacities, but to have only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. 257

James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, as principal authors of the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, expressed even more
expansive notions of multiple authoritative interpreters when they
argued that states have the power to construe the Constitution
independently of the Supreme Court.258 The Commonwealth of
Virginia in Cohens v. Virginia advanced much the same
understanding in 1821 when it argued (unsuccessfully) that the
Supreme Court was without appellate jurisdiction over state courts’
interpretations of the federal constitution.259 Furthermore,
256. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
257. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), quoted in Paulsen, supra note 174,
at 259. To be sure, “Jackson’s veto did not actually defy the Court’s ruling in McCulloch. The
Court had not ruled that it was unconstitutional not to have the Bank.” Id. at 259 n.159.
Jackson’s reasoning nonetheless reflects a notion of multiple authoritative interpreters, even
if it is unclear whether Jackson would have cabined the principle to the context of veto. For
an argument that the reasoning is not limited to the veto context, see id. at 262-84 & nn.165240.
258. THOMAS JEFFERSON , KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND 1799, reprinted in 4
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540 (2d ed. 1987) (arguing that
the “government, created by this compact, [is] not made the exclusive or final judge of the
extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not
the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among
parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself . . . .”).
259. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 290 (1821). The Supreme Court had resolved this issue five
years earlier in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), yet still devoted
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Abraham Lincoln’s position in the Lincoln-Douglas debates rested
on a similar understanding that nonjudicial actors had the
responsibility to interpret independently the Constitution, and as
President he “directed his subordinates to grant U.S. patents and
visas to citizens that the Court in Dred Scott had said could not be
considered citizens.”260
To be sure, the above historical examples may not be good law
today. At the very least, the Commonwealth’s position in Cohens v.
Virginia was decisively rejected by the Supreme Court in that case,
and the dicta in Cooper v. Aaron suggests an even more fundamental erosion of the Inherent Powers model.261 But this collection
of perspectives strongly suggests that the concept of multiple
interpreters of the Constitution is not a priori incompatible with
American constitutionalism.
Furthermore, there are three key respects in which the model of
Inherent Powers is a more radical regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters than the CBC Statute. Consequently, the precedent
that arguably undermines the first model does not necessarily apply
to community-based courts. Consider first the degree to which there
are multiple authoritative interpreters of the Constitution. Under
the first model, governmental actors apart from the Supreme Court
always have the power to offer their independent interpretations
of the Constitution. Under the CBC Statute, by contrast, only a
limited number of governmental actors have independent interpretive authority over select constitutional provisions.
The second distinction concerns the source of the power to
independently interpret. The CBC Statute is a delegation of
interpretive authority based on an express constitutional provision
—the Exceptions Clause—whereas the claim of interpretive
authority under the Inherent Powers model derives from far less
explicit sources.262 This difference makes the CBC Statute far less
eight pages to answering this question again in Cohens. For an enlightening discussion of
this curiosity, see CURRIE , supra note 71, at 98-99.
260. Paulsen, supra note 174, at 276.
261. See supra note 252.
262. This is not to suggest that the institution of judicial review and judicial supremacy
first established in Marbury v. Madison is textually grounded. As generations of scholars
have noted, Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis fundamentally is premised on nontextual
structural and policy considerations, not constitutional text. In short, both sides of the debate
rely primarily on indeterminate nontextual analyses to support their positions. Nevertheless,
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threatening to contemporary sensibilities concerning judicial
supremacy. This is all the more true because there are other wellestablished doctrines that similarly function as delegations of
constitutional interpretive authority to entities other than the
Supreme Court for circumscribed purposes.263
The third distinction between the Inherent Powers model and
community-based courts is that Inherent Powers permits other
branches of governments to disagree authoritatively with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Under the CBC
Statute, by contrast, although the community-based courts would
be empowered to fill-in interstices in determining that established
constitutional principles require a unique application in a discrete
locale on behalf of an idiosyncratic community, the communitybased courts would not have the power to decide that the Court’s
interpretation was incorrect. There accordingly is no risk of
confusion as to what is the applicable law: the community-based
courts’ interpretations would be applicable in their enclaves and the
Supreme Court’s would apply elsewhere. There also is no challenge
to the Supreme Court’s interpretive authority; other governmental
entities simply are exercising interpretive authority where the
Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to express its own views.
2. The Second Model
The second model comprises two contemporary instances in
which there are multiple authoritative interpreters of the
Constitution: the political question doctrine and the community
standards doctrine. Similar to the CBC Statute, and in contrast to
the Inherent Powers model, both examples of the second model can
be conceptualized as delegations of interpretive authority. Also akin
to the CBC Statute and unlike the Inherent Powers model, the
delegees in the second model do not have the power to determine
that the Supreme Court’s interpretations were incorrect. That the
political question and community standards doctrines are good law
definitively establishes that a regime of multiple authoritative

the burden of justification today arguably falls on challengers to judicial supremacy primarily
because judicial supremacy has largely won out as an historical matter.
263. See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
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interpreters of the Constitution is not inconsistent with American
constitutionalism as an a priori matter. The two doctrines’
similarity to the CBC Statute further suggests that the CBC
Statute also would not run afoul of basic structural requirements
of the Constitution.
Political question is the doctrine under which the Supreme Court
determines that a provision of the Constitution is not suited to
being interpreted by the Court but instead is to be construed by a
coordinate branch.264 The Court determines that the issue is not
justiciable and refuses to offer any interpretation at all, letting
stand the understanding explicitly or implicitly propounded by a
coordinate branch. Several constitutional provisions have been
identified as falling under the political question doctrine, including
the Guarantee Clause265 and important issues arising under the
Impeachment Clause266 and the Article V amendment provision.267
The political question doctrine can be conceptualized as a type of
delegation, for the Supreme Court decides that another branch,
rather than it, will provide the authoritative interpretation of the
provision at issue.268 The political question doctrine thus represents
an established example of governmental actors apart from the
Supreme Court having the power to construe authoritatively select

264. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 208-37 (1962).
265. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46-47 (1849).
266. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-38 (1993) (noting what constitutes a “trial”
for purposes of the Impeachment Clause is a nonjusticiable political question).
267. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) (noting that whether there is a time limit
by which amendments to the Constitution must be ratified by the States is a nonjusticiable
political question).
268. The rhetoric of the opinions, however, does not reflect a self-consciousness of
delegation but of duty, that is, a judgment that the provision is not capable of being
construed by the judiciary for a variety of reasons. This is not the place to ask whether the
criteria proffered by the Court to identify what is a political question provide a principled
means for demarcating nonjusticiable political questions from justiciable questions. See J.
Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA . L. REV . 97 (1988)
(asking this question); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History
of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV . 643, 667-69 (1989) (asking similar
question). To the extent, however, that certain constitutional provisions call for
interpretation by the political branches rather than the judiciary, the political question
doctrine all the more illustrates that nonjudicial supremacy is not a priori incompatible with
American constitutionalism. After all, under this understanding of the political question
doctrine, the Constitution itself constitutes a regime of inherent, rather than delegated,
multiple authoritative interpreters.
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constitutional provisions.269 The political question doctrine also
demonstrates that regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters
need not generate interpretive conflicts and doctrinal nonuniformity. There is authoritative construction by a governmental
entity apart from the Supreme Court without generating conflict
under the political question doctrine because the Court’s
determination of nonjusticiability means that it at no point offers
a substantive interpretation with which the coordinate branch’s
interpretation can conflict.270
The community standards doctrine is another271 example of a
regime of multiple authoritative interpreters through delegation
rather than inherent powers. It operates in importantly different
ways than the political question doctrine. The community standards
doctrine is part of the First Amendment law of obscenity.272
“Obscene” material receives no First Amendment protection,273 and
material is “obscene” if, taken as a whole, it (1) “appeals to the
prurient interest,” (2) “depicts or describes” sexual conduct in “a
patently offensive way,” and (3) “lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.”274 The first two prongs of the obscenity
test are determined on the basis of “community standards,”
meaning that a “juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of
the views of the average person in the community or vicinage from
which he comes . . . .”275 What qualifies as “prurient interest” and
“patently offensive” accordingly is determined on either a judicial
district-by-district or city-by-city basis.276 Thus, unlike the political
question doctrine, where there typically is only one (nonjudicial)
governmental actor that is interpreting a constitutional provision,
269. See generally Mulhern, supra note 268, at 124-27 (discussing political branches’
claims of interpretive authority).
270. There is only one conceivable exception: were the coordinate branch to conclude that
the provision had to be judicially construed.
271. But see supra note 268.
272. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1957).
273. Id. at 485.
274. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
275. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
276. Although the Court has not required as a constitutional matter that community
standards be determined on the basis of a fixed geographical area, id. at 104, states are
permitted to “impose a geographic limit on the determination of community standards by
defining the area from which the jury could be selected in an obscenity case.” Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977).
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under the community standards doctrine there are multiple
interpreters. But whereas the governmental actor under the
political question doctrine has full interpretive authority,277 each of
the multiple authoritative interpreters under the community
standards doctrine has been delegated interpretive authority only
within delimited bounds: in the application of the legal test to
identify “prurient interest” and “patently offensive.” This is similar
to the CBC Statute, under which community-based courts must
work within the Goals identified by the Supreme Court.
There is another important difference between the political
question and community standards doctrines. The community
standards doctrine invites contemporaneous nonuniformity of
interpretation. In fact, for the purpose of supporting diversity
among subnational communities, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the position that obscenity should be determined on the
basis of a single, national standard:278
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las V egas,
or Ne w Y ork City . . . . Peo ple in differe nt States vary in their
tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by
the absolutism of imposed uniformity.279

In short, the community standards doctrine’s very point is “to
permit differing levels of obscenity regulation in such diverse

277. To say that the governmental actor has full interpretive authority is not to say that
it can do whatever it wants. The actor would be bound to interpret the constitutional
provision in good faith. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (responding to Justice Souter’s hypothetical that the Senate could use a coin-toss
to decide whether to impeach by arguing that “[r]espect for a coordinate branch of the
Government forecloses any assumption that improbable hypotheticals like [the one]
mentioned by . . . Justice Souter will ever occur”); Paulsen, supra note 174, at 321 (arguing
that “the President is not bound by the other branches’ legal views, not that he may do
anything he wants. . . . [T]he President is bound by his oath to exercise independent
interpretive power in good faith . . . .”).
278. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106 (“‘[W]hen the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be
defined by reference to “community standards,” it meant community standards—not a
national standard . . ..’”) (quoting Jocabellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1964) (Warren, J.,
dissenting)).
279. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33.
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communities as Kerrville and Houston, Texas”280 so that “material
may be proscribed in one community but not in another” as a
matter of constitutional law.281
Contemporary nonuniformity, however, does not mean
inconsistency with Supreme Court doctrine. Akin to the political
question doctrine, the community standards doctrine’s regime of
multiple authoritative interpreters does not permit the creation of
interpretations that contradict the Court’s. The community
standards doctrine identifies with particularity the bounds within
which the decentralized interpreters are delegated the power to
interpose their independent judgments (i.e., what constitutes
“prurient interest” and “patently offensive”). In other words, the
community standards doctrine invites Tailoring.282 The doctrine
tolerates the contemporaneous nonuniformity among inferior
federal courts and state courts that results.
3. The CBC Statute’s Relation to the Two Models
The two models of multiple authoritative interpreters that can be
found in American law—Inherent Powers and Delegated Powers—
are highly instructive to any effort to consider the constitutionality
of community-based courts from a structuralist perspective. Most
importantly, the two models provide an unanswerable challenge
to the view that American constitutionalism demands that the
Supreme Court be the sole authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution as an a priori matter.
In addition, the two regimes of delegated interpretive authority,
political question and the community standards doctrines, provide
a useful context to analyze the Exceptions Clause and, more
specifically, the CBC Statute. The Exceptions Clause, a pillar of
the CBC Statute, can be usefully conceptualized as yet another
instance of delegated constitutional interpretation; by depriving
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction under the Exceptions
Clause, Congress in effect delegates the responsibility for
280. Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir. 1986). For more discussion of the
community standards doctrine, see Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at
1149-52, 1170-72.
281. United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 n.1 (6th Cir. 1981).
282. See Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1149-51.
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interpretation to a governmental actor other than the Supreme
Court. This consequence of de facto delegation long has been
recognized by Exceptions Clause scholars: exercise of Congress’s
power under the Exceptions Clause would put final judicial review
of the “except[ed]” constitutional provisions in the hands of the
inferior federal courts or, if Congress also stripped the inferior
federal courts of jurisdiction, the state courts.283 The CBC Statute
is a variant on this, channeling appellate review of select
constitutional provisions to community-based courts. To be sure,
the Exceptions Clause differs from political question and
community standards insofar as delegations would be made by
Congress rather than the Court. This difference, however, ought not
to matter in respect to the question at hand of whether a
multiplicity of authoritative interpreters of the Constitution is
inconsistent with the Constitution as an a priori matter.284
The political question and community standards doctrines also
assist in analyzing the constitutionality of the scope of interpretive
authority that would be enjoyed by community-based courts.285 The

283. E.g., Bator, supra note 99, at 627-29; Gunther, supra note 113, at 910-16.
284. This is not to suggest that the analogy to delegation is the sole argument that the
Exceptions Clause grants Congress plenary power—many other arguments have been put
forward by scholars, see supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text,—but only that the
plenary power interpretation of the Clause can be understood as part of a larger pattern of
delegated constitutional interpretation and for that reason is less unusual than it may
appear at first.
285. The observations in this paragraph pertain only to the CBC Statute and not to the
Exceptions Clause generally. It is unclear what interpretive authority state courts would
possess in the event Congress exercised its powers under the Exceptions Clause without
creating special community-based courts on federal property. Paul Bator has suggested that
Congress’s exercise of its power under the Exceptions Clause would permanently freeze in
place the interpretation given by the last Supreme Court precedent on the subject. Bator,
supra note 129, at 1041. It is unclear, however, to what extent this would be true for two
interrelated reasons. First, consistent with the incrementalist, common law adjudicatory
style that is constitutional law, even apparently minor factual differences, as well as changed
circumstances over time, could give rise to good faith legal conclusions that would adapt, or
continue to develop, the legal doctrines over time. Second, such a process of continued
development of the law in a manner that would make it not appear “frozen” would be all the
more likely if there in fact were no supervening authority to review the state court decisions.
Gunther, supra note 113, at 910-11 (making similar observations). Regardless of what role
state courts would play in the event Congress made a country-wide exercise of its Exceptions
Clause powers, community-based courts under the CBC Statute would have the power to
determine that generally accepted constitutional principles require different applications in
federal land for the reasons discussed supra notes 172-246 and accompanying text.
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community-based courts would have interpretive powers
somewhere on the continuum between the courts under the
community standards doctrine and the nonjudicial federal actors
under the political question doctrine, two regimes whose
constitutionality is unquestioned. The community-based courts’
powers would be less than that enjoyed by the coordinate branches
under the political question doctrine because the community-based
courts would not have the power to provide the single, nationwide
meaning of any constitutional provisions; akin to the local courts
under the community standards doctrine, the community-based
courts’ interpretations would apply only to geographically limited
areas. Furthermore, in contrast to the political question doctrine,
but similar to the community standards doctrine, community-based
courts would not have complete interpretive freedom; they would
have to accept the Goal identified by the Supreme Court. The
community-based courts likely would exercise broader interpretive
authority than the local courts under the community standards
doctrine, however, in two respects. First, the community-based
courts presumably would be empowered to construe a wider array
of constitutional questions than just the definition of obscurity.
Second, the community-based courts would have broader
interpretive authority over those delegated provisions; in other
words, the community-standards doctrine is a form of Tailoring,286
and community-based courts would have the power not only to
Tailor but also to Re-standardize.
In short, the two models of multiple authoritative interpreters
found in American constitutional law show that the view that
multiple authoritative interpreters of the Constitution is a priori
incompatible with American constitutionalism cannot stand. There
is also strong evidence that the CBC Statute would not violate
structural requirements of the Constitution because the CBC
Statute would create a regime of delegated multiple interpreters
similar to what is found under the political question and community
standards doctrines.

286. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1149-51.
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IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE TRIBAL COURT
ANALOGY
Part III showed that community-based courts would have
significant powers to offer independent interpretations much as
tribal courts do, despite the fact that, in contrast to tribal courts,
they would be interpreting constitutional law. Part IV considers
other differences between community-based courts and tribal courts
that bear on the pertinence of the tribal court experience under the
ICRA.
A. Differences Between Native Americans and Insular
Communities
There is little doubt that the benefits enjoyed by Native
Americans under the ICRA’s regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters would be enjoyed by non-Indian communities. It is selfevident, after all, that community-based courts for insular
communities would expand institutional diversity, extend the range
of communities that could flourish, and increase the range of
possible self-government. It is possible, however, that the
limitations on community-based court interpretive freedoms
discussed above287 would render the community-based courts
inadequate to meet the needs of some communities. Such a
possibility is unavoidable, for it is virtually inconceivable that any
single polity could accommodate all possible forms of communal
living.288 Nonetheless, the range of variations possible under
Targeting and Re-standardizing, along with the fact that tribal
courts have relied on Re-targeting and Tabula Rasa only
occasionally, 289 together suggest that the community-based courts
still would be adequate for many, if not most, insular communities.
The more difficult question is to what extent the contained
nature of the costs observed in the ICRA regime would carry over
to non-Indian communities.290 Furthermore, as is discussed in the
287. See supra notes 214-46 and accompanying text.
288. For a discussion of what types of communities cannot be accommodated under liberal
premises, see Rosen, supra note 1, at 1095-96.
289. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
290. This discussion expands on Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 579-81.
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next subsection, the CBC Statute could impose additional potential
costs not even implicated by the ICRA. Let us first consider the
three possible costs that are potentially relevant to both the Indian
and non-Indian communities. As discussed above, there are three
potential costs posed by the ICRA: externalities, inefficiencies, and
the undermining of the protection of rights that the ICRA was
intended to provide.291 The tribal court study suggests that these
costs have been reasonably contained under the ICRA.292 Whereas
it is impossible to draw any incontrovertible inferences concerning
costs from the practice of one set of communities to another, several
factors suggest that the lessons from the ICRA experience are to a
large degree transferable. Suggestive though not dispositive, the
ICRA jurisprudence actually provides more than one example of
contained costs; each tribe’s judiciary has final and authoritative
interpretive power of ICRA’s provisions, and the tribal case law
confirms that the tribes’ courts operate largely independently of one
another.293 Whereas this observation does not fully answer the
question of transferability because these are all tribal communities,
consistency of cost containment across multiple independent
communities makes generalizing the phenomenon of cost
containment more plausible.
Further, the contained costs cannot be attributed to tribal
predisposition to Anglo-traditions. Just the opposite is true: at the
time ICRA was passed most tribes opposed it insofar as it was yet
another instance of federal encroachment on tribal sovereignty.294
The ICRA experience accordingly cannot be explained away as
being unrepresentative of the nonconformist groups that likely
would seek the benefits of community-based courts. Nor can it be
maintained that tribal values fortuitously coincided with Anglovalues. Although there is some important overlap of values, many
tribal norms are importantly different from Anglo-political
291. See supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
292. See id.
293. Tribal courts only infrequently cite to other tribal courts and typically utilize such
opinions only for guidance when they do so. See, e.g., Rave v. Reynolds, 22 Indian L. Rptr.
6137, 6139 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1995) (noting that other tribes’ holdings “are not binding
on this court”).
294. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 7-11
(1991); Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 ‘Indian Civil Rights’ Act,
9 HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 557 (1972).
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principles.295 In fact, many tribal norms found in the ICRA case law
might be described as quite “illiberal.” For example, the tribal court
decisions reflect such arguably illiberal values as encouraging
respect for tribal authority, 296 advancing the community’s wellbeing at the expense of the individual,297 using religion to help
constitute the political community,298 defining community
membership on the basis of blood and racial lines,299 and
maintaining traditional gender roles under which men serve as
protectors of women.300
Another respect in which Native American tribes might be said
to differ from other communities that may want to benefit from
community-based courts is that Native Americans were not a
“single issue” group with respect to whom it readily could be
predicted how they would rule on the ICRA’s provisions. By
contrast, one can readily predict how some insular groups would
rule on certain issues.301 This difference between Native Americans
and other communities may be more imagined than real, however,
insofar as there are identifiable norms in tribal communities 302
that provide a basis for predicting judicial outcomes. More
fundamentally, such predictability is irrelevant. The real issue is
the normative question, answered by a thick political theory, of
which groups ought to be granted significant powers of selfgovernance and to what extent. Once that is answered, it is
irrelevant that the judicial outcomes correlate to the community’s
readily identifiable prior commitments.
In short, the tribal courts would appear to be representative of
how a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters can be expected
295. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom
in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part II of II), 46 AM . J. COMP. L. 509, 511-58 (1998).
296. E.g., Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 516, 553-54.
297. Id. at 537-38.
298. Id. at 551-52.
299. E.g., Hoffman v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6127 (Colville Tribal
Ct. 1995).
300. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 542-45.
301. Consider, for example, the Rajneesh, who believed that practice of their religion
required that they live separately from others in a homogeneous society, purchased
undeveloped land, built and incorporated a city on it, only to have it struck down under the
Establishment clause. Rosen, supra note 1, at 1082-84. It is not difficult to predict how they
would have ruled on an Establishment Clause issue.
302. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 295, at 511-58.
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to function in practice. The benefits of such a regime observed in
tribal courts likely are wholly transferable to nontribal
communities. Factors such as the numerosity and distinctiveness
of tribal communities suggest that the ICRA regime also is
representative vis-à-vis the possibility of containing the three
aforementioned potential costs that would be common to both tribal
and non-Indian insular communities.
B. Additional Potential Costs
Community-based courts that were empowered to authoritatively
and independently interpret select constitutional provisions,
however, might impose two additional costs not presented by the
ICRA’s regime of multiple authoritative interpreters of statutory
law.303 These present the most significant problems in drawing
inferences from tribal court experiences concerning the likely
results of creating community-based courts. Even so, the analysis
below does not lead to the conclusion that community-based courts
are flatly infeasible, but that more thought must be given to
clarifying the commitments that help constitute our national
political community.
1. Respect for the Constitution
The first potential additional cost is the risk that the nonuniform
interpretations of constitutional provisions that naturally would
arise would undermine citizens’ respect for the Constitution; it
could be argued that the ICRA does not pose this risk because the
law the tribal courts construe is statutory, not constitutional.304
Professor Leonard Ratner advanced such a concern vis-à-vis
citizens’ respect for the Constitution in the context of one possible
regime of multiple authoritative constitutional interpreters: inferior
federal courts that were responsible to authoritatively construe

303. But see infra note 304.
304. It also could be argued, of course, that this distinction is without significance: the fact
that “due process” or “equal protection” is construed differently is what might matter to
citizens’ respect for the Constitution.
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constitutional provisions in the event Congress used the Exceptions
Clause to strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction.305
The conclusion that the nonuniformity created by communitybased courts would undermine citizens’ respect for the Constitution
is contingent on several variables. Although the threat posed by
nonuniform interpretations of the Constitution to citizens’ respect
for the Constitution may seem intuitive, the connection between
nonuniformity and loss of respect is by no means obvious. In fact,
before 1914, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction did not
ensure uniformity of interpretation of the Constitution across the
states. There was no Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state
court interpretations of the Constitution (and other federal law)
that found in favor of plaintiffs, even if the state court had
interpreted the federal provision differently than the Court had.306
There is no historical evidence to suggest that before 1914 there
was a shortage of citizens’ respect for the Constitution. As a purely
empirical matter, then, nonuniformity does not ineluctably lead to
the undermining of citizens’ respect for constitutionalism. Whether
it does more likely turns on citizens’ expectations.
Furthermore, to the extent that there is a connection between
nonuniformity and respect, it is important to note that not all
regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters equally threaten
citizens’ respect. Citizens’ respect is most vulnerable in the regime
Ratner was discussing, where each state’s highest court could play
the role of final and authoritative interpreter of the Constitution
and there might exist no single interpretation that was applicable
across the country.307 The threat of undermining citizens’ respect
for the Constitution would be smaller in the community-based
court regime for three reasons. First, the power to construe
authoritatively would be granted to only a limited number of actors
305. Ratner, supra note 132, at 932-36. Ratner concluded that varying interpretations
would undermine citizens’ respect for the Constitution, and that this was a reason to
conclude that Congress did not enjoy plenary power under the Exceptions Clause. Id.
Whereas most scholars have rejected Ratner’s conclusion concerning the scope of the
Exceptions Clause, see supra note 129, the possible loss of respect for the Constitution
remains relevant to assessing the possible costs of a regime of community-based courts.
306. See supra note 130.
307. Most of the country, to be more precise. See generally Rosen, Our Nonuniform
Constitution, supra note 10, at 1149-66 (showing the geography-based variations from
ordinary constitutional doctrines that are found in contemporary constitutional law).
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in discrete geographical enclaves, thereby limiting the quanta of
potential nonuniformity. Second, the community-based court’s
interpretation would not be a claim as to what the provision
means—which would carry with it the implicit suggestion that
other interpretations are incorrect—but instead would be a
determination of the provision’s appropriate application to the
idiosyncratic needs of the special community.308 This might help to
explain why the many variations across locales of what the
Constitution requires309 has not undercut citizens’ respect for the
Constitution. Third, there would be far less risk that communitybased courts would undermine citizens’ respect for the Constitution
because they would be subject to the interpretive limitations
discussed above:310 the courts would have to abide by the Goals
identified by the Supreme Court.
Of course, to say that the CBC Statute would be less problematic
than the regime Ratner was considering does not mean that
community-based courts would not pose any risks at all to citizens’
respect for the Constitution. It is impossible to determine in
advance how problematic such a regime would be, however, because
it ultimately is an empirical question that would turn on normative
considerations as well as how well the community-based courts
functioned. Normative considerations are relevant to citizens’
respect for the Constitution insofar as they shape citizens’
expectations.311 If citizens thought there were strong constitutional
308. See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text. It would be far harder for a state
court to make such a claim, for few if any state borders are coextensive with meaningful
communities whose characters are sufficiently monolithic to justify the claim that the state
court is merely adapting the provision to the needs of a discrete community. Cf. James A.
Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State
Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX . L. REV . 1219, 1227 (1998)
(concluding that “the character differentiation hypothesis,” which seeks to explain state
constitutional interpretation on the basis of distinctive state characteristics, “does not hold
up”); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA . L.
REV . 389, 389-96 (1998) (same).
309. For example, the rules of free speech and search and seizure vary as between general
society, military bases, and public schools. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note
10, at 1152-56 (general society and the military); id. at 1159-61 (public schools).
310. See supra notes 216-46 and accompanying text.
311. This role of citizens’ expectations is supported by the powerful arguments advanced
by several scholars that the Constitution was originally designed to be interpreted by all
branches of the federal government and accordingly was intended to be a regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters. See supra notes 251-63 and accompanying text. If citizens’ respect
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reasons for accommodating select insular communities by means of
community-based courts, it stands to reason that their respect for
the Constitution would not be undermined by such courts; indeed,
citizens’ respect might be strengthened in much the same way that
the Nazis marching in Skokie and flag burning strengthened many
people’s commitment to the Constitution. Whether citizens’ respect
is undermined also likely turns on the substantive doctrines created
by the community-based courts. If the community appeared to be
taking seriously the task of giving expression to the constitutional
provisions that reflect both its community’s needs as well as the
values underlying the provision,312 it is quite plausible that citizens’
respect would not be undercut.
2. Creating a National Political Community
A second additional possible cost of community-based courts is
interference with the creation of the national political community.
Professor Ratner alluded to this possible cost, as well, when he
argued that the Exceptions Clause does not give Congress plenary
power on the basis that “[t]he Constitution makes us one nation. It
is the symbol of our shared purposes.”313 There are two aspects to
this concern: whether a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters of the Constitution would preclude the creation of a
national political community at all, and whether the citizens living
in the federal enclaves would remain part of the national political
community.
With regard to the first aspect of national community, whether
the presence of limited numbers of regimes of multiple
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution threatens the
possibility of forming a national political community ultimately
did not turn on expectations, but if instead respect would necessarily be gutted by the
presence of multiple authoritative interpreters of the Constitution, then the Constitution as
originally designed was structured in a manner so as to undermine citizens’ respect for it.
312. This has occurred in tribal courts. Rosen, Of Tribal Courts, supra note 10, at 522-78.
313. Ratner, supra note 132, at 941; see also; SANFORD LEVINSON , CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
5 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L. REV .
1, 25 (1996) (noting the conclusion of some that “the people of the United States are, in some
fundamental sense, constituted by our commitment to the Constitution and the principles
of the Declaration of Independence. At the level of national self-definition, a commitment to
constitutional principles . . . defines the people of the United States.”) (footnote omitted).
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depends on one’s views of the substantive content of the national
political community. If the “shared purposes”314 that constitute our
national political community include the granting of liberty and
associational rights that require grants of significant powers of selfgovernance to select communities, then the creation of communitybased courts would help to realize, not hinder, formation of the
national political community.315 Another factor that determines the
effect of a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters is the level
of detail of the “shared purposes” that constitute the national
community. If the community-constituting shared purposes are
broad principles rather than doctrinal details,316 then having a
national political community is not inconsistent with the
differential application of the broad principles across some locales.
The reasonableness of this is suggested by the durability of our
national political community despite the fact that constitutional
protections such as free speech and search and seizure do vary from
place to place in some important respects. For example, these
constitutional provisions require one thing in Manhattan and
something different on a military base.317
314. Ratner, supra note 132, at 941.
315. It seems to me that scholars’s normative inquiries concerning the question of whether
various hypothesized foundational commitments lead to the conclusion that certain insular
groups must be given space to largely run their own lives, see supra note 3, can be usefully
understood as philosophical examinations of what commitments constitute our national
political culture.
316. See TUSHNET , supra note 175, at 9-14 (suggesting this).
317. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1152-56. The plausibility of
maintaining a national political community on the basis of shared commitments to broad
principles also may be suggested by our country’s temporal experiences with constitutional
law insofar as there has been a certain continuity of political community over time even
though the doctrinal details of constitutional law have changed radically over time.
Nevertheless, I would not want to make too much of this point about changed doctrines over
time, for I believe it well could be argued that the best way to characterize matters is that
our country has an importantly different national political culture today than we had in 1789,
1865, or, indeed 1920. Ultimately, it seems to me, what defines a political community is only
partly given by the abstract principles (such as a commitment to due process and equal
protection) to which the polity is committed. The far more important determinant of what
characterizes the political community is the concrete definition of the metes and bounds of
the principles, which (among other things) demands the determination of how each
commitment relates to competing commitments at the points when they come into conflict.
It seems to me that a single national community can be maintained even across political
communities that demarcate in different ways the borders of shared principles – but only up
to a point. At some point, the concrete contours of “shared values” are too different to fairly
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The answer to the second question of whether persons living in
the federal enclaves would be part of the national political
community turns on both normative and empirical considerations.
The normative considerations hinge once again on the substantive
content of the character of the national political community. If
membership in the national community were understood to require
lockstep citizen incorporation of the details of the Supreme Court’s
doctrinal formulations, then any variations in community-based
courts perforce would take citizens in the enclaves outside the tent
of the national political community. This, however, likely is an
inaccurate description of what constitutes the national political
community on both normative and empirical bases. Instead,
membership in the national political community more probably is
a function of shared commitments to principles of a higher level of
generality. If this is true, then the commitment shared by
inhabitants of the federal enclaves to principles such as due process
and equal protection means that they may be able to remain
members of the national political community, even if the principles’
applications vary in the insular community enclaves from what is
required in most other places in the country. 318
Finally, the requirement that community-based courts accept the
Goal of constitutional provisions may be sufficient, if not ideal, to
create a national political community over a country as large and
diverse as ours. That limited numbers of community-based courts
need not undermine the national political community or citizens’
respect is strongly suggested by the fact that our constitutional
order already tolerates limited variations of constitutional
requirements across locales that are created by Tailoring and Restandardizing. 319 The community-based court regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters accordingly would alter current practice
by a matter of degree rather than kind.
describe the two polities as being part of the same political community. As discussed in the
text above, it seems to me that the degree to which the national political community can
tolerate different expressions of shared abstract commitments iteratively turns on the
content of the national political community itself. I plan to pursue these questions concerning
political culture and political community in future work.
318. See TUSHNET , supra note 175, at 9-14 (making similar argument). But see supra note
317 (discussing the role of concretizing foundational principles in defining the political
culture).
319. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 10, at 1144-47, 1149-66.
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To conclude, although the potential costs to citizens’ respect and
the national political community are important, there is no reason
to think that such costs inevitably would be actualized. Whether
and to what extent such costs are incurred turns on normative as
well as empirical considerations. The normative considerations are
whether and to what extent our constitutional commitments
counsel us to accommodate insular communities and, relatedly, are
the substantive commitments that constitute our national political
community’s identity. The empirical considerations concern how
community-based courts are likely to behave. Two factors, however,
suggest that community-based courts cannot be rejected out-ofhand. First, the tribal court experience under the ICRA is
comforting. Second, community-based courts would be subject to
greater limitations on their interpretive freedoms than apply to
tribal courts.
CONCLUSION
The Exceptions and Property Clauses may permit the creation of
community-based courts on federal property. Subject to modest but
important limitations, such courts would have the power to
construe independently select constitutional provisions without
federal or state court review (or possibly with only highly
deferential judicial or executive review) and accordingly would be
analogous to the regime of multiple authoritative interpreters of
federal quasi-constitutional law that can be found in tribal courts
under the the ICRA. Community-based courts would be a vehicle for
granting extensive powers of self-governance to particularly
deserving communities. Moreover, the availability of communitybased courts is pertinent to assessing the relative benefits of private
and public ordering in respect of according insular groups room to
run their own lives; community-based courts create an immunity
from constitutional limitations as construed by ordinary federal
courts, and this immunity narrows (though does not eliminate)
private ordering’s most important competitive advantage over
public ordering of freedom from constitutional limitations.
The ICRA case law illustrates the many potential benefits of
a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters. It also suggests
that the potential costs associated with a regime of multiple
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authoritative interpreters can be reasonably contained. Most of the
lessons from the ICRA regime are transferable to non-Indian
community-based courts. Community-based courts that construe
constitutional law, however, could pose two risks that are not
present under the ICRA’s statutory regime: the threat of
undermining respect for the Constitution and interfering with the
creation of our national political community. The limitations on
community-based courts’ interpretive freedoms would help to offset
these risks without significantly curtailing the benefits that
community-based courts would be intended to provide. Whether the
risks materialized ultimately would depend on both empirical and
normative considerations that merit additional careful thought. The
normative considerations include an assessment of whether and to
what extent our country’s foundational commitments demand the
accommodation of some insular communities by affording them
significant powers of self-government. A second crucial normative
question concerns the nature of our country’s national political
community; depending on its content, it is possible that the creation
of community-based courts could help to further realize, not hinder,
it.
In short, there is astonishing flexibility in this country’s
constitutional federal structure. It may be doctrinally possible to
grant heretofore unimagined powers of self-government to insular
communities. Ultimately, whether such decentralization of political
power is doctrinally permissible and practical turns on normative
considerations. Because this Article has focused on doctrine, not
normative questions, it, somewhat ironically, cannot fully answer
the doctrinal question of whether the type of political
decentralization it has discussed is constitutional. Much has been
accomplished, though, if the Article has succeeded in showing that
so extraordinary a grant of political power as authorization to offer
independent constitutional interpretations is not flatly foreclosed
by the Constitution. This recognition, in conjunction with the
promising results in the ICRA regime, jointly underscore the
relevance of taking seriously the underlying normative questions
concerning whether and to what extent insular communities ought
to be granted significant powers of self-governance.

